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Some commentators recently have argued for changes in how United 
States Supreme Court Justices communicate with other federal courts, 
other branches of the federal government, state governments, lawyers, and 
the public at large; that is, with everyone, except (perhaps) other Justices 
of the Supreme Court and the Justices’ assistants. Specifically, some 
commentators have urged that signed opinions and separate opinions, 
such as concurrences and dissents, stop being published in the official 
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reporters.1 One commentator also has advocated nonpublication of the 
vote count in Supreme Court decisions.2 In this piece, I offer my thoughts 
in response to these proposals.3 
I. RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR PENROSE 
According to her article, Overwriting and Under-Deciding: 
Addressing the Roberts Court’s Shrinking Docket, the proposal by 
Professor Penrose of Texas A&M University School of Law to cease 
publication of signed opinions and separate opinions was motivated 
primarily by two concerns. First is the relatively small number of cases 
that the Court is deciding. Second is the set of effects on the Court as an 
institution that she posits are following from the combination of the 
relatively small number of cases that the Court is deciding and the 
* Professor of Law Emerita, Chicago-Kent College of Law; University Distinguished Professor
Emerita, Illinois Institute of Technology, A.B. 1969, University of Rochester; J.D. 1973, Harvard 
University. Thanks to Michael Solimine and Bryan Lammon for their helpful comments on a draft of 
this Article, and to Mandy Lee, Research & Instructional Services Librarian at Chicago-Kent College 
of Law, for her research assistance.  
1. Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), (July 25, 2019) (revised Jan. 
21, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425998 [https://perma.cc/E83D-
Y5JV]; Meg Mary Margaret Penrose, Overwriting and Under-Deciding: Addressing the Roberts 
Court’s Shrinking Docket, 72 SMU L. REV. F. 8 (2019) [hereinafter Penrose, Overwriting and Under-
Deciding]; Meg Mary Margaret Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 25 (2020) [hereinafter Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions].  
2. Sherry, supra note 1. 
3. There is a very substantial body of scholarship debating the virtues and vices of signed
opinions, dissents, and concurrences by U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Professors Penrose’s and 
Sherry’s contributions are among the most recent. I cannot, in this space, address all of the arguments 
that have been made by multiple authors over decades, but I will do my best to evaluate these most 
recent forays into the debate by Professors Penrose and Sherry. Notable previous writings on these 
subjects include: Thomas B. Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 
103 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (2018); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 
427, 435 (1986) (describing dissents as contributions to “the marketplace of ideas”); William O. 
Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 104, 105 (1948) 
(asserting that “[d]isagreement among judges is as true to the character of democracy as freedom of 
speech itself”); Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion—Its Use and Abuse, 3 MO. L. REV. 120 
(1938); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990); Samuel 
Estreicher & Tristan Pelham-Webb, The Wisdom of Soft Judicial Power: Mr. Justice Powell, 
Concurring, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 229 (2008); Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 SUP. 
CT. HIST. SOC’Y J. 33; Russell Smyth & Paresh Numar Narayan, Multiple Regime Shifts in 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79 
(2006); Richard B. Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last 
Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952); Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme 
Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2015); Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the 
Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2006); Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme 
Court A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 186 (1959); Kevin M. Stack, Note, The 
Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L. J. 2235 (1996).  
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relatively large number of concurring and dissenting opinions that the 
Justices are writing and publishing.4 
Professor Penrose has marshaled data concerning the low 
productivity of the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, in terms 
of the number of signed opinions per year and of signed plus per curiam 
opinions per Term,5 and concerning the high number and length of 
concurring and dissenting opinions published by the Justices of the 
Roberts Court.6 This is not to say that the problem of what Professor 
Penrose sees as overwriting and underdeciding began with the Roberts 
Court, but it has worsened while Justice Roberts has been Chief Justice.7
I do not question the data that she cites. Part of what motivates Professor 
Penrose’s proposal relates to her assumption that if Justices were spending 
a lot less time writing concurring and dissenting opinions, they could and 
would devote that time to considering, and hopefully resolving, many 
more cases.8 She writes that, “Were the Court simply to decide cases—
without attributing names to its opinions—the notoriety [sic] incentive 
would disappear and more work would likely get done. . . . The shift . . . 
would help ‘place emphasis on the serious nature of the Court’s 
decisions . . . .’”9 Then, “[t]he Court should publish only the decision ‘of 
the Court’ by ‘the Court.’”10 
I have a number of reactions to this reasoning. First (but not in order 
of importance), I seriously doubt that any of the Justices need to be 
reminded of the seriousness of the Court’s decisions and the effects of 
those decisions. Indeed, the Justices’ appreciation of the seriousness of 
their decisions is very likely reflected in the Justices’ felt need to explain 
their thinking (in separate opinions) about the legal issues presented to the 
Court. Second, while a prohibition on publication of concurring and 
dissenting opinions might cause Justices to spend less time on writing 
such opinions, it might not. A prohibition on publication is not the same 
as a prohibition on writing. Justices might very well craft concurring and 
dissenting opinions that would be circulated among the Justices in an 
effort to persuade other Justices to change the Court’s proposed opinions 
or even the Court’s decisions. If so, little if any savings of Justices’ time 
would flow from a ban on publication of the separate opinions. Professor 
4. Penrose, Overwriting and Under-Deciding, supra note 1, at 8–10.
5. Id. at 8–9.
6. Id. at 9–10. 
7. Id. at 8–13. 
8. Id. at 15. 
9. Id. at 17 (quoting Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at
an Old Colleague, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 45 (1994–1995)).  
10. Id. at 17. 
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Penrose says that the Justices should be working on collaborating and on 
reaching consensus, rather than working on writing separate opinions.11 
But an effort to reach consensus does not guarantee that the Justices will 
succeed. For reasons that I will elaborate later,12 when the Justices do not 
reach consensus, burying their differences of opinion does not strike me 
as always (or even usually) preferable to articulating and 
communicating those differences. 
Third, such a ban on publication of separate opinions might enable 
the Court to make more decisions by virtue of a savings of time and effort 
spent on the crafting of separate opinions, but whether the ban actually 
would yield more Court decisions is quite speculative. Justices might find 
no more cert-worthy cases than they do now. The Court’s capacity to 
decide is not, at least formally, a criterion for whether certiorari should be 
granted.13 Regardless of whether more cert petitions were granted, a ban 
on publication of separate opinions might render the aggregate workload 
one that left Justices with time on their hands, but they could choose to 
spend that time in ways other than reaching consensus on decisions and 
majority opinion writing. Justices might, for example, devote more time 
to different work to the extent that laws and governing rules permit them 
to do so. In recent years, Justices have spent a considerable amount of 
time writing autobiographies and memoirs, doing book tours, lecturing, 
judging appellate moot court arguments at law schools, conducting mock 
trials of fictional and historical persons, teaching, talking to students in 
high school or college, and appearing in documentaries and on 
television.14 The Justices might choose to do more of all that. As of 1991, 
Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States under Title III 
of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 Concerning Gifts, as amended, and 
Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States under Title VI 
of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 Concerning Outside Income, Honoraria, 
11. Id. at 19. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 24–27, 47–56, 61, 63–69. 
13. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (stating the factors relevant to the grant of petitions for writs of
certiorari, none of which relates to the Supreme Court’s capacity or time to decide the questions 
presented). The considerations relate to conflicting decisions on important matters or important 
federal questions, decisions that so depart from—or sanction the departure from—the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court’s supervisory powers, and 
decisions of important questions of federal law that have not been, but should be, settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
14. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES 37–38 (2013). 
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and Outside Employment15 did not apply to officers and employees of the 
Supreme Court. However, the Members of the Court resolved that officers 
and employees of the Court would comply with the substance of those 
regulations, subject to certain clarifications, including one that has to do 
with the circumstances under which the covered individuals may receive 
compensation for teaching.16 In the view of some in our society, Justices’ 
greater engagement in such “extra-curricular” activities might not be 
positive. For those commentators and citizens who are concerned about 
Justices cultivating fan bases,17 those extra-curricular activities could 
contribute to the problem—even if not as much as separate-opinion-
writing does. Such activities might even demean the Justices more widely 
and more profoundly than separate-opinion-writing does; that also would 
not be good for the Court’s reputation and legitimacy. For all of these 
reasons, it is highly speculative whether prohibiting the publication, or 
even the writing, of separate opinions would increase the number of cases 
that the Supreme Court would decide, and it likely would be controversial 
whether the Justices’ expenditure of more time on non-Court work (in 
time freed by a reduction in time spent on separate opinions) would be 
time well spent. 
Moreover, to the extent that the goal (or a goal) of a prohibition on 
separate opinions (or the publication of such opinions) by Supreme Court 
Justices is motivated by the belief that such a ban would lead to the 
Court’s decision of more cases, one can question the value judgment of 
the desirability of that result. Particularly in a time of deeply felt 
partisanship in this country and strongly held differences of opinion 
among Justices (which parallel some of those partisan divides), there may 
be benefits in the Court deciding fewer issues and controversies than it 
might. Those benefits would run particularly (but not only) to persons and 
viewpoints that would come out on the losing side if the Court were to 
decide additional issues and controversies. Decisions by a Court with a 
substantial number of Justices who hold “extreme” views would likely be 
at greater risk of being overturned or modified by a more moderate future 
Court. Such departures from precedent would likely feed criticisms of 
lawlessness, even if the future decisions were preferable “on the merits.” 
15. 2C THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 
(1996), has chapters on gifts and outside earned income, honoraria and employment, including 
references to relevant statutes and regulations. Id. at Chs. 6, 10.  
16. SUPREME COURT, RESOLUTION ¶ 3 (1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-
2019/WashingtonPost/2012/02/21/National-Politics/Graphics/1991_Resolution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V9F6-APYP]. 
17. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 1, at 3, 7–8, 10, 12, 16, 36–39. 
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In sum, fewer extreme decisions are preferable to many such decisions—
so it is not at all clear that we should embrace “reforms” that are designed 
to increase the number of decisions that the current Court or a future, even 
more skewed Court, would reach. A related point is that a relatively low 
number of decisions by the current Court or a future, even more skewed 
Court, also might tend to tamp down (or at least not exacerbate) already 
overheated partisanship in the judicial selection process. 
Professor Penrose’s other motivation in criticizing signed and 
separate opinions lies in a collection of pernicious effects that she 
attributes to the proliferation of separate opinions. Such opinions, she 
writes: 
• “add[ ] . . . to a polarized and politicized society by focusing
on individual Justices as opposed to one Supreme Court”;18
and
• undermine clear communication of the law, clarity of the
law, uniformity of the law, accessibility of the law to the
average person, the institutional integrity of the Court,19 and
the Court’s decisional role.
These detriments are not outweighed by benefits of signed separate 
opinions, she says, because the individual opinions “will likely never 
become the law.”20 Separate opinions “elevate writing over deciding.”21 
While these criticisms contain some truth, some of them unfairly 
target separate opinions. Majority opinions often can clearly establish the 
law, clearly communicate the law, and make the law uniform. Other 
Justices’ disagreement with a majority’s reasoning and conclusion (or 
with just its reasoning) does not need to undermine the clarity or 
uniformity of the law or undermine its clear communication. But I should 
not overstate this point: although separate opinions need not undermine 
the clarity of the law (if and when it is clear), they sometimes may do so. 
Similarly, while readers of Supreme Court opinions need to remember 
that the opinions of concurring and dissenting Justices are not the opinion 
of the Court, and that dissents do not have precedential weight, the 
precedential weight of concurring opinions is a more controversial and 
subtle matter, particularly where there is a plurality, rather than a majority, 
opinion of the Justices.22 
18. Penrose, Overwriting and Under-Deciding, supra note 1, at 15. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 14. 
21. Id. at 16. 
22. See, e.g., Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, supra note 
3, at 847, 855, 875 (finding that lower courts do, and suggesting that they properly, follow the 
6
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In addition, the extent to which the law as established by opinions of 
the Supreme Court is accessible to the average person is, to a significant 
extent, distinct from what concurring and dissenting Justices have to say. 
In many areas, the law has become so complex that it is not easily 
comprehended by the average person, but the difficulties in making the 
law comprehensible are a function of the law’s complexity and the 
Court’s—and commentators’—ability (or inability) to explain it simply 
enough that the average American can understand it. The existence of 
concurring and dissenting opinions might either help or harm the 
understandability of either a majority opinion or the understandability of 
the set of opinions.23 
It is not entirely clear to me what Professor Penrose means when she 
speaks of the institutional integrity of the Court. If the Court has 
institutional integrity when, but only when, it speaks with one voice, then 
by definition there will be a loss of institutional integrity whenever 
Justices file separate opinions. Similarly, if the only role of the Court that 
is important is the Court’s making of decisions (by a majority of Justices), 
then a fortiori separate opinions will be a waste of time and effort that 
potentially undermine the Court’s making of decisions. For the reasons 
identified above and probably others as well—there is no guarantee that 
the Court would make more or better decisions if Justices ceased to write 
or publish separate opinions. 
To the degree that separate opinions not only reflect but add to a 
polarized and politicized society, my own view is that the respectful airing 
of differing, even quite opposing, views is far more desirable than hiding 
the differences of opinions that Justices hold. Nastily stated disrespectful 
dialogue in published opinions of the Justices is unnecessary and may 
contribute to unleashing even more uncivil speech among people of the 
guidance provided by “pivotal concurrences,” those in which a judge concurs in the judgment, thereby 
ensures the existence of a majority opinion, but also writes separately; and viewing pivotal 
concurrences as signaling the direction of legal change and smoothing the way for that change); 
PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 92 (2010) 
(finding evidence that concurrences affect the Supreme Court’s interpretations of its own precedents 
and the extent to which lower courts positively interpret Supreme Court majority opinions); Igor 
Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring 
Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995) (observing that, “although technically without direct 
decisional force, concurring opinions have often exercised a greater effect on subsequent cases than 
the majority opinions that they accompany”).  
23. See, e.g., CORLEY, supra note 22 (finding evidence that concurrences send a signal about
the scope of the accompanying opinion, providing guidance to lower courts as to how to interpret and 
apply the Court’s opinion); Kirman, supra note 22 (noting that, “concurrences provide a commentary 
on the decisions that they accompany and may aid lower courts in interpreting and applying such 
decisions”). 
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nation, so it should be discouraged; but honest and civil disagreement is 
healthful and demanded by integrity. Only through such interchange do 
we have a chance to reach new consensuses. To artificially block such 
interchange from the people is unwise, maternalistic, and contrary to the 
spirit of the First Amendment. The people of our country demand 
transparency.24 To deny us the honest opinions of our Supreme Court 
Justices would be a big step in the wrong direction. 
Professor Penrose’s article also fails to credit the positive functions 
that dissents and concurrences serve. These include demonstrating flaws 
in the majority’s legal analysis and offering a corrective; promoting the 
careful study of one’s own and the opponent’s position; emphasizing the 
proper limits of a majority opinion that appears to sweep too broadly; 
sowing seeds for harvest in the future when the majority (or other courts) 
are susceptible to persuasion that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision 
was erroneous or no longer serves the values of the country; permitting 
Justices to take positions that are most consistent with their true views; 
and communicating with the executive and legislative branches and even 
with the people, who can seek change through the political process.25 “By 
publishing dissents along with majority opinions[,] common law honors 
losing visions of justice; it suggests that it would be legitimate and 
appropriate for them one day to form a majority.”26 
As stated by Charles Evan Hughes, 
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it 
strongly commends the decision to public confidence. But unanimity 
which is merely formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong, 
conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may 
be the effect upon public opinion at the time. This is so because what 
must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character 
and independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide 
cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while 
it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their 
independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity 
should be secured through its sacrifice. . . . A dissent in a court of last 
resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of 
24. The demand for transparency is illustrated by requests for televised Supreme Court
arguments, for cameras in the Supreme Court courtroom, the expectation of televised impeachment 
hearings, and the like. 
25. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative Judicial
Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 590–91, 596 (1994); Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2005). 
26. Jacobson, supra note 25, at 1631. 
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a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.27 
Even more recently, Professor Penrose wrote an article28 advocating 
the elimination of concurring opinions by Supreme Court Justices. In that 
article, Professor Penrose reiterated her dissatisfaction with the length, 
lack of clarity, and fractured nature of Supreme Court opinions, as well as 
the unprofessional tone of some separate opinions. She held concurrences 
largely to blame, giving a “pass” here to dissents because they “add . . . 
principled disagreement.”29 The primary focuses of her paper were the 
theses that: 
• concurring opinions are “undemocratic” in that they seek to
deny the “winners,” those who have persuaded a majority of
the Justices (if there is a majority), of a supposed prerogative
to state the reasoning of the majority without challenge; that
is, without an effort by other Justices to limit or undermine
the law as crafted by the majority opinion.30 Professor
Penrose argues that, even worse, Justices who concur in the
Court’s decision but not in the opinion of other Justices can
leave the Court with only a plurality opinion that makes it
difficult to discern what precedent the decision makes;31
moreover,
• concurring opinions “destroy the clarity and authority of a
majority opinion” without adding value.32
Professor Penrose marshals and then seeks to rebut several 
arguments that other scholars and judges have made in support of 
concurrences and other separate opinions. She counters the arguments that 
such opinions: 
A. “appeal to the wisdom of a future day,” by noting that 
separate opinions rarely become law;33 
B. “provide litigants with road-maps for future cases,” by 
asserting that Court opinions should “not provide legal sign 
27. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67–68 (1928). 
28. Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 2–3, 5. 
30. Id. at 4, 22, 24–25. 
31. Id. at 4, 25–26, 28, 44–45. 
32. Id. at 29, 56. 
33. Id. at 5, 16–20, 29, 38–43. 
9
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posts to gin up litigation”;34 and should not seek to change 
settled law;35 
C. “improve and sharpen the majority opinion,” by asserting 
that this is wholly unnecessary—observing that the Justices 
are smart people;36 
D. “assure the losing party that all arguments were adequately 
considered; and . . . that the justices are not being ‘lazy’ or 
protecting incompetent colleagues,” by averring that these 
arguments “ring hollow” and noting that separate opinions 
can undermine the Court’s credibility.37 
More generally, Professor Penrose offers (what I regard as) a very 
cramped view of the role of the Court in support of her opposition to 
concurring opinions. I will detail and respond to these aspects of her 
analysis below.38 
I will respond in the order in which I have summarized Professor 
Penrose’s arguments above. First, as the history set forth by Professor 
Penrose and others reveals,39 the airing of “antagonistic views” in separate 
opinions dates back in England to the Privy Council and in the United 
States to the early days of the country when the “U.S. Supreme Court . . . 
largely followed the British Law Lords’ practice of separate, seriatim 
opinions.”40 Starting in 1801 under Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court 
abandoned the seriatim approach and issued single opinions of the Court 
in an effort to add credibility and authority to the Court’s decisions and to 
enhance the power and prestige of the Court relative to the other branches 
of the federal government.41 But this move was controversial. President 
Jefferson (among others) criticized it, expressing concerns about lack of 
34. Id. at 29–30. 
35. See id. at 4, 22. 
36. Id. at 30. 
37. Id. 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39–80. 
39. Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 7–13. See also M. Todd
Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 
283, 303–11; John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 144 (1999); Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the 
History of Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069 (1995); Nancy Maveety, The Era of the Choral 
Court, 89 JUDICATURE 138, 139 (2005) (discussing the history of and reasons for concurring opinions; 
asserting that “concurring voices produce the legal debate that furthers the intellectual development 
of the law on the Supreme Court”); ZoBell, supra note 3, at 193–94. 
40. Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 7–13, quotation at 8–9. 
41. Id. at 9. See supra note 39 and other articles enumerated infra note 42. 
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transparency and interference with public scrutiny of judicial conduct.42 
In general, the practice of issuing single opinions for the Court continued 
until the late 1930s or early 1940s, when separate opinions became 
common.43 That history demonstrates that separate opinions by Supreme 
42. See Kelsh, supra note 39, at 145–46 (quoting DONALD GRANT MORGAN, JUSTICE 
WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER: THE CAREER AND PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN 
JUDGE 169 (1954)) (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 
which Jefferson argued that opinions of the Court, unaccompanied by separate opinions, deprive the 
citizenry of knowledge of the views of individual members, shielding the Justices’ reputations and 
the Justices from impeachment and providing a curtain behind which Justices might be lazy or 
incompetent, and urging abandonment of the practice to restore confidence in the Justices). Other 
letters written by Jefferson in 1820 and 1821 delivered similar messages. See Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), quoted in PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 24 (1969); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (Dec. 1821), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 198–99 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-1899). 
43. The history of the Court’s move from opinions of the Court that almost never were
accompanied by separate opinions to majority opinions that increasingly were accompanied by 
concurring and/or dissenting opinions are described in articles that include those cited supra note 39. 
See also ZoBell, supra note 3, at 193–209. There were dissenting Justices before that, and after Chief 
Justice Marshall’s reign (see ZoBell, supra note 3, at 195–203 (discussing the work of Justices 
William Johnson, Benjamin R. Curtis, John Marshall Harlan, and Oliver Wendell Holmes)), but the 
trend accelerated thereafter as more Justices came to view it as their duty to express their own opinions 
and came to recognize the potential power of dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Zobell, supra note 3, at 
197, 202. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, supra note 14, at 266–67, 289 
(2013), finds the rate of dissenting and concurring opinions in the Supreme Court to have jumped 
suddenly and steeply in the early 1940’s, likely because many dissents had become law (including 
the dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. 
dissenting), Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting), and 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting)), so the perceived value of dissenting 
had gone up. Epstein et al. do not conjecture about the likely cause of the increase in concurring 
opinions, but the explanation may be the same: the perceived value of concurring opinions may have 
increased in part because separate opinions generally had proven their potency. Cass Sunstein finds 
1941 to be the turning point in the increase of separate opinions. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 795–96 
(“[T]the Judiciary Act of 1925 eliminated mandatory appeals and gave the Court its modern authority 
over the cases that it hears. As a result, the Court could focus on the difficult cases . . . . We might 
well expect that[,] after the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925, there would be a significant shift 
in the direction of division, because the Court would . . . be dealing with a much larger percentage of 
hard cases. Pamela C. Corley et al. insist that the establishment of the discretionary docket was ‘a key 
external development that helped usher in a new era of dissensus.’(citing PAMELA C. CORLEY ET AL., 
THE PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 27 (2013)). This 
is a tempting explanation, and it might provide part of the picture, but there are at least three reasons 
to think that it is inadequate. First, there was disagreement in the earliest periods of the Court, and . . . 
a norm of consensus was required to reduce its public expression. Second, . . . the docket books of 
Chief Justice Waite, from . . . 1874 through 1888, reveal substantial (private) disagreement within the 
Court. . . . Nonetheless, norms in favor of consensus ended up squelching public disclosure of their 
disagreements. Third, there was a significant lag between enactment of the Judiciary Act and the 
transformation of 1941. Because the relevant patterns were not much changed between 1925 and 
1940, we cannot say that the Act was sufficient to produce the new patterns. As Walker et al. put it, 
“[s]imply stated, a radical jump in dissent following 1927 is not evident. Dissent rates did not begin 
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Court Justices have been common for roughly the past 80 years. They are 
not an aberrant modern innovation. 
Nor is it at all clear that the practice is fairly criticized as being 
“undemocratic.” The federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, 
are not democracies. The Justices are not elected; they are nominated by 
the President and appointed with the consent of the Senate. Many of the 
rules by which the Court operates are not democratically determined. 
Although there are codified Supreme Court Rules that are promulgated by 
the Court but have to be approved by Congress,44 the Court has important 
internal procedures that it determines for itself. Examples include the 
requirement that four Justices must vote to grant a writ of certiorari before 
the Court will hear a case that is not within its mandatory jurisdiction,45 
and the requirement of a majority vote to support a decision that the Court 
will describe as a decision “of the Court.”46 Thus, in that sense, it seems 
to be a nonsequitur to charge that separate opinions, and concurrences in 
particular, are “undemocratic.” Moreover, in our democracy, people 
whose views differ from the majority at a given moment are under no 
obligation to “shut up.” They are free to voice their opinions and hope to 
change society’s perspective. The value that we place on such speech is 
their major upward move until the early 1940s.” (Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise 
of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 366 (1988).) None of these 
points deny that the Judiciary Act might have contributed to the new patterns. . . . [W]ithout the Act, 
the post-1940 Court might have been able to agree in a significantly higher percentage of cases. . . . 
Nor can we rule out the view that the Act was a necessary condition for the new the patterns. But 
because disagreement was common (but not expressed publicly) before the Act, and because the norm 
of consensus persisted for well over a decade after the Act became law, it is not an adequate 
explanation of what began to happen in 1941.”). 
44. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018), authorized the Supreme Court Rules,
among other sets of rules. 
45. See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10
(1983). For discussion of other internal procedures determined by the Court, see EUGENE GRESSMAN 
ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 323–30 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing practices of the Court including 
the rule of four, the practice of not stating reasons for denials of certiorari, and the practice of requiring 
agreement of a majority of eligible Justices for a judgment of the Court); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING 
TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 41–51, 64–69 (1991). For a 
forthcoming work on the practice of majoritarianism, see Guha Krishnamurthi, For Judicial 
Majoritarianism, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming).  
46. See Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1692 (2014). The Court in October 2019 published an updated Guide for Counsel in Cases to Be 
Argued Before the United States Supreme Court, in which it announced that the Court generally will 
not ask questions of lead counsel for petitioners or respondents during the first two minutes of 
argument. This is another example of the Court making procedure for itself. See CLERK OF COURT, 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guide%20for%20Counsel%202019_rev10_3_19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J43W-5J52]. 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/2
2019] RESPONSE TO PENROSE AND SHERRY 537 
reflected in the First Amendment to the Constitution. Analogously, there 
appears to be nothing undemocratic about Justices sharing, in separate 
opinions, how their views differ from those of the majority of Justices, if 
any. Professor Kevin Stack,47 when he was a law student, published a Note 
that argued quite to the contrary that the political legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court depends “on its consistency with democratic rule,”48 and 
such rule “depends [in part] on the Court reaching its judgments through 
a deliberative process.”49 That process, in turn, “connotes an 
argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each other as 
equal in authority and entitlement to respect, jointly directed . . . to 
arriving at a reasonable answer . . .”50 and reaching a collective—although 
not necessarily unanimous—decision.51 “Given the secrecy of the Court 
during the formation of its judgments,”52 the practice of dissent—
importantly including “the practice of publishing dissenting opinions 
alongside the opinion of the Court, with notation of which Justices joined 
these opinions”53—is necessary to manifest the deliberative character of 
the process through which the Court reaches its decisions.54 “Without this 
practice, those of us outside the Court would have no way to see the Court 
as embodying a deliberative process of judgment.”55 Everything that now-
Professor Stack said about dissents applies as well to concurrences; they 
too are a significant part of the argumentative interchange among the 
Justices that is manifested in the publication of separate opinions.56 
Additionally, while it is true that the state of our law concerning how 
lower courts, and the Supreme Court itself, should interpret and apply 
Supreme Court plurality opinions is problematic and difficult to apply, 
our response should not be to disallow plurality decisions or disallow the 
47. Lee S. & Charles A. Spier Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
48. Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 
2246, 2247–55 (1996).  
49. Id. at 2236. 
50. Id. at 2251 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989)). 
51. Id. at 2253–55. 
52. Id. at 2236. In regard to the secrecy of the Court’s internal processes, see id. at 2256
(pointing to the Justices’ private conferences, their private exchange of draft opinions, and the ensuing 
dialogue among the Justices). 
53. Id. at 2256. 
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2257. 
56. Indeed, Stack notes that “The practice of ‘dissent,’ as [he] use[s] the term, includes
concurring opinions that offer reasoning different from the reasoning of the Court’s majority opinion.” 
Id. at 2235 n.2. For further discussion of concurrences, see supra text accompanying note 23, text 
following note 24, note 43, text accompanying notes 47–55, infra text accompanying notes 58–62, 
text following notes 63 and 68, and text accompanying notes 175–76. 
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publication of concurring opinions. A better response would be to 
improve the law governing the interpretation and application of plurality 
opinions. A number of scholars have made an effort to do that,57 and 
presumably, others will follow until the Supreme Court sees fit to make 
adequate improvements. 
Professor Penrose also questions the value of concurring opinions, 
observing that separate opinions rarely have become law. She 
acknowledges, however, that some concurring opinions later were 
embraced by the Supreme Court.58 And other scholars have noted that 
lower courts “often [go so far as to] ignore the rule of five and . . . look[] 
for the binding rule . . . in concurrences.”59 Lower courts also frequently 
rely on concurring opinions when the concurrences are “pivotal” in the 
sense that if the separately writing Justice or Justices had not joined the 
Court’s opinion, there would be no majority.60 
I would add that we have not yet reached the end of time. That is, it 
remains possible that concurring opinions already written and concurring 
opinions yet to be written (if they are permitted) will prove to be 
persuasive to a future majority of Supreme Court Justices or to Congress 
or, where applicable, to state Supreme Courts or state legislatures or state 
Governors. Other scholars have found additional benefits in concurring 
opinions’ ability to encourage lawyers to focus their efforts in particular 
directions, thereby encouraging but also “smoothing” and foreshadowing 
the process of change in the law.61 Concurring opinions also may persuade 
Congress to change statutory law in accordance with the views of 
concurring Justices.62 
57. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019); Adam 
Steinman, Nonmajority Opinions and Biconditional Rules, 128 YALE L. J. F. 1 (2018); Nina Varsava, 
The Role of Dissents in the Formation of Precedent, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 285, 
293, 302, 341 (2019) (noting that “procedures for interpreting and following plurality decisions vary 
considerably across courts and judges,” and suggesting that “when a majority of judges agrees on 
legal principle, that principle should have binding effect, even if the judges in principled agreement 
are divided on the judgment”); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and 
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017). 
58. Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 18 nn. 98–115. 
59. Thomas B. Bennett et al., supra note 3, at 845 (citing Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Powelling 
for Precedent: “Binding” Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 707–12 (2009) 
(describing instances in which lower courts treated as controlling Justice Powell’s pivotal concurring 
opinion)). 
60. Id. at 855 (reporting empirical support for the proposition that lower courts “look[] to
pivotal concurrences [defined id. at 847] for guidance as to the governing rule, rather than simply 
adhering to the rule of five.”). 
61. Id. at 869–71. 
62. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162 (2002) (finding that “[O]pinions that invited congressional override were in fact twice as likely 
14
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Professor Penrose dismisses the arguments that separate opinions 
improve and sharpen the majority opinion, “assure the losing party that all 
arguments were adequately considered; and . . . that the justices are not 
being ‘lazy’ or protecting incompetent colleagues.” To her, these 
arguments “ring hollow,” and she points out that, if separate opinions can 
be reassuring in these respects, separate opinions equally can undermine 
the Court’s credibility.63 In my experience, no matter how smart and able 
lawyers and judges are, the articulate statement of differing points of view 
helps to improve their writing. On courts, those articulate statements of 
differing point of view are delivered in separate opinions. Separate 
opinions may highlight something the author of another opinion did not 
think of; and separate opinions may make points that the author of another 
opinion recognizes should be addressed in his or her own opinion, whether 
or not the concurrence is published. It is clear to me beyond any doubt 
that separate opinions can and usually will improve majority opinions. As 
to the other points noted above, when you are a losing party and the 
majority opinion says nothing about some of your arguments, that silence 
can be frustrating and leave you wondering why the majority has not 
addressed those arguments. If a dissenting or concurring opinion does 
allude to your arguments, you know that at least some of the Justices paid 
attention to them and brought them back to the attention of the majority 
through their separate opinions. That is not a lot of solace, but it is some. 
Similarly, separate opinions prove that Justices, and more than the one 
who penned the deciding opinion, were paying attention, spent some 
energy on the case, and are seeking to hold the majority accountable. All 
of these have value in a system that seeks to assure litigants that they have 
been heard and are not only consistent with, but essential to, deliberative 
to be overridden.”); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of 
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 164 n. 4, 165–66, 
178 n. 21 (1999) (finding that if one includes invitations to override in concurring or dissenting 
opinions as well as in majority opinions, then eleven percent of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretations followed strong invitations for Congressional override). See also Douglas Rice, 
Placing the Ball in Congress’ Court: Supreme Court Requests for Congressional Action, 47 AM. POL. 
RES. 803, 804–05, 808 (2018) (arguing and finding empirical support for the thesis that Supreme 
Court invitations for congressional action are designed to strategically frame subsequent debate at the 
Court by identifying Congress, rather than the Court, as the actor to reverse the Court majority’s 
policy preferences “at the cost of minor increases in the possibility of congressional review” but with 
the benefit of creating an additional barrier for those seeking to alter the policy through the courts). 
Rice also found that such invitations are most likely to occur in cases in which the Justices are divided 
and that such invitations “are associated with higher rates of ideological voting.” Id. at 805. Moreover, 
“[g]iven the contemporary ‘do-nothing Congress’ and political polarization, the ability to utilize 
invitations strategically becomes a yet more valuable tool, while a fractured Congress is unable to 
reply.” Id. at 825.  
63. Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 6. 
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decision making by the Court. I don’t know why those considerations 
“ring hollow” to Professor Penrose. Moreover, rather than undermining 
the Court’s credibility, the existence of concurring (and dissenting) 
opinions should demonstrate the serious attention that the members of the 
Court gave to a case. The fact that Justices have differing perspectives 
may reflect their differing life experiences and differing values, but it need 
not undermine their honesty, integrity, or credibility. 
Professor Penrose also opines that Court opinions should “not 
provide legal sign posts to gin up litigation.”64 I see this point as related 
to her cramped view of the role of the Court. She sees the Court as an 
entity whose role is to objectively decide cases and to say what the law 
is.65 In her view, the Court should not be “activist,” should not “make” 
law or debate what the law should be, should not seek to influence public 
opinion or to change settled law.66 Her view is that concurring opinions 
do not decide cases, do not say what the law is, and tend to do all the 
things she is opposed to the Court doing.67 But (in response, I say that) 
while the Court’s primary function is to decide cases, and in the course of 
doing so to say what the law is, many of the questions that the Court is 
charged with answering are not matters of settled law. If settled law 
answers a question, there typically is no need for the Court to grant 
certiorari. In deciding cases, the Court is compelled to make law, and in 
doing so it is entirely appropriate for the Justices to consider what the law 
should be. This is what Justices must do when they develop the law and 
think through their decision.68 It is an illusion that the law is out there, 
available to be found, like a lost coin.69 This reality leads the Justices to 
debate what the law should be held to be and can lead to different 
perspectives among the Justices, just as it can lead to differences of 
opinion among lower court judges, among other members of the legal 
64. Id. at 30. 
65. Id. at 30, 42, 45. 
66. Id. at 41, 42, 45–46. 
67. Id. at 43–44. 
68. I allude to a quotation from Nygaard, supra note 9, at 47, that Professor Penrose cites
approvingly; see Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 41 n.117. 
69. But see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 532 (2019) (arguing that 
judges can find law but only if there is something to find). Sachs also argues that, “Even when judges 
can’t help breaking new ground in their decisions, they’re still just making decisions; they don’t have 
to be making law.” Id. at 560. Moreover, even when it comes to courts of last resort, “[a]s a matter of 
legal theory, there’s no reason why the holdings of a court like the Supreme Court of the United States 
must necessarily be taken to represent ‘the law,’ as opposed to ‘the law of the Supreme Court,’ binding 
on other courts within the reach of its appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 562–63. Even on Sachs’ view, 
however, judges often have to make precedential decisions in the face of legal uncertainty; there often 
is not law simply waiting to be found. 
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profession, and among members of the public. In the course of explaining 
their reasoning, dissenters and concurring Justices may either 
intentionally or merely incidentally suggest other disputes and other 
litigation that might further clarify the law. Why is that problematic? 
Moreover, while the Justices do write opinions for audiences other than 
the litigants, this is as it should be. If a case raises issues that are important 
only to the parties to the current litigation, it usually will not belong in the 
Supreme Court. Aside from unusual occasions when the Court seeks to 
right a serious wrong in a particular case, the Court’s function is to decide 
cases that raise issues that are important to segments of the society and 
that frequently have split the appeals courts that have faced those issues 
in distinct cases.70 Thus, Professor Penrose’s complaint that opinions, 
including concurrences, seem to be written more for an external audience 
than for the litigants71 seems to me misplaced. Whether or to what extent 
the opinions are written for “like-minded devotees”72 imputes a generally 
unknowable motivation; and, if it is true, that would not make the opinion 
any less the true, considered opinion of the issuing Justice. 
Similarly, why is it necessarily wrong for the Court or individual 
Justices to seek to influence public opinion and to change settled law?73 
If the Court refrained from doing those things, Plessy v. Ferguson and 
other undesirable decisions still would be the law of the land.74 
Professor Penrose also launches broadside attacks that are little 
supported but hard to disprove, as when she asserts that “Modern 
justices . . . use their separate opinions to influence public opinion and 
seek to change settled law. . . . most in those cases where dissension only 
undermines the objectivity of the Court and its members.”75 She cites 
cases as examples but does not explain how these cases support the 
70. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (regarding the criteria for the grant of certiorari). 
71. Penrose, supra note 1, at 41. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 42. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overruling, Invitations, Time
Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779 (2011) 
(examining—and considering the audience for and the costs and benefits of—various tools other than 
overruling that Supreme Court Justices use to move the law). These include statements of intention—
in judicial opinions—to change the law in the future, inviting Congress to overrule statutory 
precedents, inviting litigants to seek overruling from the Court, and adding dicta or unnecessary 
analysis in a judicial opinion with an eye toward influencing decision of a future case.  
74. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see supra note 43 for other cases in which dissents 
foreshadowed later changes in Supreme Court-made law. 
75. See also Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, supra note 1, at 42 (asserting that
“[w]hen the country needs to know that the Court has done its job . . . [,] the separate opinion 
writers . . . strike out against their colleagues, attack the process, undermine the institutional 
legitimacy of the Court and add instability. . . .”). 
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proposition. And how has she determined that these are cases where 
dissension undermined the objectivity of the Court and its members and 
did that “only”? I agree that when the country most desires certainty “in 
both result and the non-political nature of legal decision-making,”76
unified decisions can be helpful, but Justices acting in good faith and in 
an intellectually honest manner may not be able to provide unified 
decisions. Sometimes legal disputes are inextricably intertwined with 
political questions and, whether that is the situation in a particular case or 
not, barring Justices from filing concurring opinions would provide a false 
and misleading impression of unanimity that (in my opinion) would 
seldom, if ever, be worth the price. 
Professor Penrose believes that, “Surely most cases do not 
necessitate separate writing,”77 but the Justices clearly do not agree. She 
wishes that the Justices would “voluntarily agree to reign themselves 
in,”78 particularly when it comes to the writing of concurring opinions and 
that dissenters would frequently file a short “dubitante” notation instead 
of a full-blown dissent;79 but she doesn’t believe it will happen. Thus, she 
urges the American Bar Association to reinstate Judicial Canon 19. It used 
to state: 
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort 
should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion 
and the consequent influence of judicial decision. A judge should not 
yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation 
than that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in cases of 
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting 
opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.80 
The Canon, part of the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, was replaced 
by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which the ABA adopted in 
1972.81 Given the depth of Professor Penrose’s opposition to concurring 
76. Id. at 42. 
77. Id. at 48. 
78. Id. at 49. 
79. Id. at 50. 
80. AM. BAR ASS’N, CANON OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pic_migra
ted/1924_canons.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF4F-X9Z5]. 
81. “In 1969, the ABA again began a comprehensive process to review, evaluate and update
the judicial ethics canons. The resulting Model Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 
1972, changed the style and form of the rules, providing 7 canons in place of the original 36 canons, 
and cleaning up much of the hortatory language while maintaining the substance of the canons.” About 
the Commission, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/policy/judicial_code_revision_project /background/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FQJ-6LT8]. In 1990 and thereafter, the Code was further revised. Id. Specifically, 
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opinions, this strikes me as a quite modest response. Professor Sherry 
prescribes stronger medicine. 
II. RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SHERRY
A. A Summary of Professor Sherry’s Arguments, and Preliminary 
Responses 
Professor Suzanna Sherry has written a very thoughtful and 
comprehensive article82 arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court is “broken,” 
in large part because the Justices problematically have become celebrities 
who play to their fan base, with a variety of detrimental consequences.83
She urges that to limit the Justices’ opportunities to continue to act in this 
way and thereby contribute to the dysfunctionality of the Court, Congress 
should pass a law that (1) requires each case in which the Court has agreed 
upon a majority opinion to be decided by an unsigned opinion that does 
not disclose the number of Justices who join it, (2) requires each case in 
which a majority of the Court agrees upon a decision but in which no 
majority of Justices subscribes to a single opinion to announce that the 
decision below is affirmed or reversed (as is appropriate in the particular 
case, and without disclosing the number of Justices who join the decision), 
but that the Court cannot agree on the reasons for that decision, and (3) 
prohibits the publication of concurring and dissenting opinions.84 She 
concludes that that law would be constitutional and that, with respect to 
the nonconstitutional objections to her proposal, the proposal’s probable 
benefits outweigh its probable costs such that the country should try this 
system as an experiment.85 I will summarize her main arguments 
concerning this proposal and explain where and why I disagree. 
Professor Sherry finds dysfunction in several features of the Court, 
its work product, and in consequences of those two.86 She points to the 
reduction in the number of cases that the Court is deciding, the increase 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association on August 7, 1990, was amended on August 6, 1997, August 10, 1999, August 12, 2003, 
February 12, 2007, and August 10, 2010. It includes a preamble, a section concerning the persons to 
whom the Code applies, and four Canons. No part of the Code speaks to concurring, dissenting, or 
otherwise separate opinions. 
82. Sherry, supra note 1. 
83. Id. at 3, 7–8, 10, 12, 16, 36–39. 
84. Id. at 13, 19 (arguing on the latter page that all parts of her proposal are necessary to
accomplish its various goals). 
85. Id. at 21–28 (addressing constitutional objections), 28–37 (addressing nonconstitutional
objections). 
86. Id. at 2–3, 6–9.
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in the number of pages it writes to decide those cases, the abundance and 
characteristics of concurring and dissenting opinions, the increasing 
number of cases the Court disposes of without a majority opinion, the 
sometimes uncivil sniping of the Justices at one another, the polarization 
of the Court consistent with the views of the political party of the President 
who appointed the respective Justices, the media’s and the public’s view 
of the Court as largely a political institution that decides most cases on the 
basis of ideology and the consequent drop in public confidence in the 
Court, and the increased politicization of the nomination and confirmation 
processes.87 She posits that Justices’ evolution into celebrities who 
“market[] their brands”88 and play to their bases—in public speeches, 
movies, books, television appearances and the like, as well as in their 
judicial opinions—exacerbates the other dysfunctionalities.89 That 
evolution into celebrities, she says, undermines public confidence in the 
Justices’ and the Court’s impartiality90 and encourages the Justices to 
“author more separate opinions and write more intemperately.”91 This in 
turn increases the perception—of the media, the public, and politicians—
of the Court as political and polarized, which then raises the stakes of 
confirmation hearings and endangers the Court’s legitimacy.92 The 
behavior of the Justices outside the operations of the Court also may 
render the Justices “reluctant to engage in internal deliberation and 
unwilling to compromise” in the activities of the Justices as Justices.93 It 
may cause their views to become more extreme, which will be reflected 
in their conduct on the Court at the same time as (and in part because of) 
a decline in loyalty to the Court as an institution.94 Professor Sherry 
concludes that “If we can change the incentives and reduce the ability (or 
the temptation) to seek celebrity status, we might be able to make the 
Court at least somewhat less dysfunctional.”95 
To that end, Professor Sherry advocates the requirements and 
prohibitions that I outlined above,96 and explains why all parts of her 
proposed law are necessary to accomplish her goals.97 In support of her 
87. Sherry, supra note 1, at 2–4. 
88. Id. at 4. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Sherry, supra note 1, at 7 n.33. 
94. Id. at 9. 
95. Id. 
96. See supra text accompanying note 83.
97. Sherry, supra note 1, at 19. First, however, she considered other proposals to repair the
Court and dismissed them as insufficient. Because this section of her Article does not directly relate 
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proposal, she identifies the “salutary effects on the current dysfunctions” 
for which she hopes and that she believes would follow.98 
In particular, Professor Sherry argues that effectuation of her 
proposal would: 
(1) Enhance the authority and legitimacy of the Court by portraying 
it as in “monolithic solidarity.” 
Professor Sherry argues that the desirable consequences of apparent 
solidarity are a likelihood of greater acceptance by and respect from the 
public, a greater likelihood of compliance by lower courts, a reduced 
chance of later overruling by the Supreme Court, reduced odds of a 
statutory overruling by Congress, and a lower likelihood of disparagement 
of Court decisions as political or ideological.99 
Response: In response, I would say that several of these ostensibly 
desirable consequences are not so desirable if a decision itself is 
problematic for any number of reasons. A decision might misread the law; 
it might be bad as a matter of policy; it might overrule a prior Supreme 
Court decision without good reason; etc. In those situations, greater 
acceptance and respect from the Supreme Court itself, the lower courts, 
Congress and the public actually might leave the country burdened by a 
bad decision longer than the country otherwise would be. Moreover, the 
“monolithic solidarity” on which these effects would be predicated might 
be an illusion. The decision in fact might reflect a vote by five Justices 
over the opposition of four Justices. In addition, the consequences that 
Professor Sherry attributes to apparent “monolithic solidarity” might or 
to the proposal that I focus on, I will not discuss my reactions to her discussion of these other 
proposals. 
98. Id. at 13. 
99. Id. at 13–14. It is true that the presence of separate opinions does correlate positively with 
congressional overrides. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 336–37, 349–50, 350 n.41 (1991) (finding that, in a study of federal 
court statutory interpretations that were the subject of overrides from 1967–90, “decisions subject to 
judiciary committee scrutiny were much more likely to have a dissenting opinion and to reflect a close 
division on the Court; this was particularly true of decisions that were ultimately overridden. Not 
surprisingly, issues that generate division in the Court are the ones most likely to generate serious 
congressional scrutiny.”); see id. at 349, Table 8. Id. at 349–50, n.41 reports in part that, “72% of the 
overridden decisions (13 of 18) reflected 6-3 or 5-4 votes, while only 47% of the examined-but-not-
overridden decisions (41 of 87) reflected such votes . . . .”); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 
425, 428, 446 (1992). Professors Solimine and Walker did a statistical study of the overruling of 
Supreme Court decisions between the years 1968 and 1988, noting that, “[B]ecause some of the fifty 
statutes modified more than one decision, there were a total of fifty-six decisions in the sample. . . . 
[The study found that] [o]f the fifty-five cases overridden, forty-four had at least one vote in dissent 
(and of those, eleven had two dissenting votes, seventeen had three dissenting votes, and ten were 
five-four decisions. Fifteen of the cases had at least one concurring opinion.”).  
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might not actually occur, for reasons elaborated below.100 In brief, it may 
be that monolithic solidarity is not the key to enhanced authority and 
legitimacy of the Court. 
(2) Alter the Justices’ view of their roles so as to diminish their 
concerns with individual reputation and reinvigorate the importance that 
they place on the reputation of the Court as an entity.101 
Response: Professor Sherry draws a direct line between reducing the 
Justices’ opportunities to write separate opinions and helping to break 
down the Justices’ partisan loyalties.102 
While it might be a good thing in and of itself for the Justices to 
rebalance their concerns with individual reputation and their concerns for 
the reputation of the Court as an entity, I have reasons to be leery of 
eliminating Justices’ ability to communicate their individual views in 
individual opinions that accompany the Court’s decision (if there is one). 
As described both earlier and later in this piece, the price of that silencing 
may be unacceptably high.103 
(3) Reduce the number of cases without a majority opinion. 
Professor Sherry reasons that, under her proposal, Justices will have 
less reason to refrain from joining an opinion in order to create or bolster 
a majority, and the opinion-writer will have more reason to write the 
opinion in a way that will attract four or more others. Moreover, with the 
protection provided by anonymity, other Justices may be more open to 
compromise and amenable to persuasion than they now are.104 The Court 
will want to avoid an embarrassing number of decisions without 
supporting opinions and, even if there come to be no more majority 
opinions than there are now, the opinionless decision “might be easier on 
lower courts: rather than having to divine the meaning of a fractured 
decision, they would . . . mak[e] and follow[] circuit precedent 
[presumably consistent with the prior Supreme Court decision]105 until 
and unless the Supreme Court issued a ruling [i.e., a majority opinion]”106 
inconsistent with the Circuit’s prior decisions. 
100.  See supra text accompanying notes 47–56; see infra text accompanying notes 135, 158. 
101.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 14–15.  
102.  Id. at 15. 
103.  See supra text at notes 24–27, 47–56, 61, 63–99; infra text at notes 135, 158. 
104.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 15. 
105.  Without initially having been presented with Supreme Court reasoning, it sometimes might 
be quite difficult for intermediate federal appellate courts to know whether, in a particular case, they 
need to follow a Supreme Court decision. The uncertainty would be conflict generating, but that itself 
would tend to pressure the Supreme Court to arrive at a majority opinion. Compare id. at 18 n.97.  
106.  Id. at 16. 
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Response: This “excerpt” indicates that there is reason to believe that 
Professor Sherry’s proposal would likely increase the number of cases 
with a majority opinion, but there is no guarantee of that. Insofar as the 
proposal would not have that effect, the question whether lower courts—
and other persons affected by the Court’s decisions—would be better off 
with an opinionless decision or with multiple opinions is a debatable one. 
As previously discussed,107 multiple opinions unaccompanied by a 
majority opinion pose a challenge to lower courts that are trying to 
determine and apply the rules established by a Supreme Court case, but at 
least the multiple opinions provide indications of the Justices’ thinking. 
The absence of any Supreme Court opinion and the presence of a naked 
affirmance or reversal may leave even greater uncertainty as to how lower 
courts should decide cases that are not “on all fours” with the case 
previously decided by the Supreme Court. 
(4) Provide “incentives for the Justices to reach consensus on an 
opinion that is just maximalist enough to provide guidance.”108 
Response: This is a hypothesis of Professor Sherry’s. She 
acknowledges that prohibiting concurrences might yield more minimalist 
opinions, so written in an effort to persuade a majority to sign on.109 She 
further acknowledges that her proposal might produce “overly minimalist 
opinions to start.”110 But she notes that a majority can issue wide and deep 
opinions and that the (posited) absence of (otherwise feared and 
constraining) concurring and dissenting opinions will free majorities to 
write such wide and deep, guidance-providing opinions—assuming that 
five or more Justices would accept the opinion. The degree to which and 
the frequency with which that would happen remains an unknown. 
Professor Sherry argues that Justices freed from playing to their bases can 
devote more time and energy to providing guidance to the public and to 
lower courts, but even if they “can” it is not clear that they will, in part 
because the depth of their agreement may not go so far. Indeed, if a 
majority of the Justices can agree on a decision but not on an opinion, 
there will be no transparency at all. And, as noted, an opinion that is 
relatively skeletal (because that is all a majority of Justices can agree 
upon) will leave many open questions for the intermediate appellate courts 
to wrestle with. 
107.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
108.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 17. 
109.  Id. at 17. 
110.  Id. at 18. 
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B. Rejoinders to Professor Sherry’s Arguments 
Professor Sherry begins from the premise that the Supreme Court 
would not adopt her proposals on its own. Internal efforts to motivate the 
Justices to seek consensus have not succeeded, and “the norm of separate 
opinion-writing . . . has become entrenched.”111 Thus, she is convinced 
that “[o]nly Congress can successfully limit the Court to a single 
unattributed opinion,”112 and I presume that she also would say that only 
Congress could successfully eliminate the publication of vote counts. The 
proposal to have Congress impose these requirements and restrictions on 
the Court provokes Constitutional objections grounded in the First 
Amendment, separation of powers, and Article III. 
1. With Respect to the First Amendment
First, I want to state that I have no great expertise in First 
Amendment law. Nonetheless, I can bring some pertinent information and 
thoughts to bear. Professor Sherry’s position is that litigants (and 
presumably therefore the citizenry at large) have no First Amendment 
right to receive either signed or reasoned opinions of the Court. A fortiori, 
litigants and the public have no First Amendment-based right to receive 
dissents or concurrences with or without attribution to their authors.113 In 
support of these conclusions, Professor Sherry cites both the Court’s 
issuance of per curiam opinions on the merits, some with and others 
without reasoned explanations, and the common absence of explanations, 
vote totals, and dissents from denials of certiorari.114 Those are facts with 
which I cannot argue. However, there is a recognized First Amendment 
right to receive informed opinions. Justice Souter (joined by Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg), dissenting in Garcetti v. Ceballos,115 remarked 
that: 
[T]he individual and the public value of . . . speech . . . may well be 
greater . . . when [a government] employee speaks pursuant to his duties 
in addressing a subject he knows intimately for the very reason that it 
falls within his duties [than when the employee speaks about other 
matters]. . . . The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in 
111.  Id. at 20. 
112.  Id. 
113.  See id. at 21. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410, 428, 430–31 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to 
disseminate it.116 
When Justices of the Supreme Court write separate opinions expressing 
their informed opinions, they are government employees speaking 
pursuant to their duties as such—even though in our current system, they 
do not have a duty to write a separate opinion in any particular case—and 
a public interest exists in receiving those informed opinions. Thus, 
contrary to Professor Sherry’s view, litigants and citizens at large may 
well have a First Amendment right to receive the separate opinions that 
Justices wish to write and publish, unlimited by interference from a 
distinct branch of the federal government such as Congress.117 
Do Justices have a First Amendment right to write or publish dissents 
or concurrences? Professor Sherry relies on Garcetti v. Caballos118 in 
concluding that the Justices have no such right. For reasons that follow, I 
do not believe that Garcetti disposes of the issue, but no Supreme Court 
case explicitly affirms the right of judges or even Justices to write or 
publish dissents or concurrences either. In Garcetti, the Court 
distinguished between the speech of a government employee in his or her 
capacity as a citizen and the speech of a government employee speaking 
in his or her capacity as such. The Court found the former speech to be 
protected when the individual spoke (as a citizen) on a matter of public 
concern. But the Court held that “[w]hen public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties,” their speech may be punished 
or restricted by their government employer.119 The Court emphasized that 
a government entity has broad discretion to restrict speech when it acts in 
its role as an employer but that (even then) the restrictions it imposes must 
116.  Id. at 433 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam)). 
 117.  Regarding the First Amendment-grounded right to receive information, see, e.g., Bd. of 
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“Our precedents 
have focused ‘not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but 
also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of 
information and ideas.’ First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). . . . This 
right [to receive information and ideas] is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and 
press . . . [T]he right to receive ideas . . . follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right 
to send them: ‘The right of freedom of speech and press . . . embraces the right to distribute literature, 
and necessarily protects the right to receive it.’ Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (citation 
omitted). . . . [T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful 
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas. . . . This right to receive information and ideas . . . is fundamental to our free 
society.”). See generally 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:73 (rev. ed. 2020). 
118.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
119.  Id. at 424–26. 
25
Steinman: Response to Penrose and Sherry
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
550 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:525 
be directed at speech that has the potential to affect its operations.120 
Unlike the fact situation presented by Garcetti, Professor Sherry’s 
proposal does not entail a restriction of the speech of Justices by their 
employer. Congress does not employ the Justices; it is not in a chain of 
command that encompasses the Justices; and the requirements and 
limitations on speech that Professor Sherry would have Congress impose 
on the Justices do not have the potential to directly affect Congress’s 
operations.121 Thus, Garcetti v. Caballos does not control the issue posed 
by the proposal, and I disagree with Professor Sherry that Garcetti 
“means” that, within the bounds of separation of powers principles, 
Congress is free to specify what Justices may or not say. 
It also is relevant that First Amendment jurisprudence generally 
recognizes utterances as speech protected by the First Amendment unless 
the speech falls into narrow, largely unprotected categories such as 
obscenity, “fighting words,” speech that creates a clear and present danger 
of imminent harm, true threats, defamation with actual malice, and child 
pornography.122 Consequently, there is little reason to doubt that Justices 
enjoy a First Amendment right to express their opinions about the cases 
that the Court has either a statutory duty to decide or has chosen to decide 
via the exercise of its certiorari powers. Intermediate federal appellate 
courts have recognized this. For example, in In re Kendall123 the Third 
Circuit reversed the contempt conviction of a superior court judge for 
publishing a judicial opinion that chastised a state supreme court for 
issuing a particular writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit noted that courts 
inferior to the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly have held that a “judge does 
not check his First Amendment rights at the courthouse door.”124 It 
agreed, saying: 
What a judge says in an opinion is sufficiently expressive to trigger First 
Amendment review. The judge “inten[ds] to convey a particularized 
120.  Id. at 419.  
 121.  Nor would the proposed requirements and limits indirectly affect Congress’s operations 
significantly more than they would affect the operations of the many others whom the Court’s 
opinions may affect. 
122.  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 
11.3 (4th ed. 2011) (elaborating upon categories of unprotected and less protected speech); Edward 
Eberle, The Architecture of First Amendment Free Speech, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1191, 2101, 1206 
(2011) (discussing the evolution of free speech doctrine, including what categories of speech remain 
largely unprotected) (regarding “true threats” citing Virginia v. Black, 539 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)); 
Daniel Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 
IND. L.J. 917, 928–30 (2009). 
123.  In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 124.  Id. at 824 (citing In re Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1289, 1289 (9th Cir. Jud. Counc. 
2011) (Kozinski, C.J., sitting alone)). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/2
2019] RESPONSE TO PENROSE AND SHERRY 551 
message” by explaining his legal analysis and conclusions . . . . Indeed, 
as pure speech on public issues, a judicial opinion “occupies the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and is thus “entitled 
to special protection.”125
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that candidates for judicial office 
have First Amendment rights that need to be respected.126 
It similarly is worthy of note, by way of analogy, that the speech of 
United States Senators and Congresspersons in the House of 
Representatives is protected by the Constitution.127 The Speech or Debate 
Clause of Article I, section 6, clause 1, provides that such Senators and 
Representatives “shall not be questioned in any other Place” “for any 
Speech or Debate in either House.”128 The Speech or Debate Clause “was 
designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government broad freedom of 
speech, debate, and deliberation, without intimidation or threats from the 
Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that 
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process.”129 It prevents 
the “intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before 
a possibly hostile judiciary.”130 Although the Speech or Debate Clause is 
viewed as primarily protecting separation of powers and only incidentally 
protecting individual legislators, it also has been recognized to be linked 
to the First Amendment.131 While there is not a parallel provision in the 
 125.  Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)). See generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM 
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 257 (2013) (noting the self-
expressive character as well as instrumental effects of judicial opinions). 
 126.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that Minnesota’s 
canon prohibiting candidates for election to judicial office from announcing their views on disputed 
legal or political issues that are within the province of the court for which the candidate is running 
violated the First Amendment). 
 127.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1; but see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616, 626–28 
(1972) (holding in part that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect a legislator’s private re-
publication of material from the Congressional Record for the benefit of constituents because 
informing citizens is not a “legislative” act entitled to constitutional immunity). Justice Douglas 
dissented, reasoning that liability for re-publication would be not only a violation of the speech or 
debate clause but also a violation of the first amendment. See id. at 636–48 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 128.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1. See generally Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative 
Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973). 
129.  Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
130.  Id. at 617. 
 131.  See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 (noting that, “The Speech or Debate Clause was designed 
to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation 
without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.”). See generally Michael L. Shenkman, 
Talking About Speech and Debate: Revisiting Legislative Immunity, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 
360–61 (2014) (“Given the broad impact of the First Amendment, it is striking to consider that the 
Speech or Debate Clause comprised the entirety of free speech protection in the Constitution as 
initially written in 1787. Indeed, the Framers of the Bill of Rights looked to parliamentary privilege 
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Constitution that applies to Justices or judges, the courts have long 
fashioned common law that similarly gives immunity from liability to 
federal judges and Justices for anything they say in their capacity as 
such.132 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing however, no Supreme Court 
decision specifically upholds the right of Justices under the First 
Amendment to write or publish concurring or dissenting opinions. That 
absence of precedent may, however, be attributable to the absence of 
occasions when Congress or the Executive branch sought to restrict the 
speech of Justices133 rather than being circumstantial evidence of an 
absence of First Amendment protection. 
Before moving on, it is extremely important to acknowledge that 
Professor Sherry’s proposal does not go so far so to recommend that 
Congress prohibit Supreme Court Justices from expressing their separate 
opinions (about the cases that the Court has heard) in any time, place, or 
manner other than in formal dissents or concurrences to be published in 
the authorized reporters of Supreme Court decisions.134 It may be that this 
feature of her proposal would protect it from a First Amendment 
challenge, for the government is entitled to impose reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions on speech. On the other hand, the traditional 
as embodied in the Speech or Debate Clause to find the principles that animated the First Amendment. 
Only later, in 1791, was the Bill of Rights submitted and ratified, providing for a direct free speech 
right in the citizenry. In practice, the free speech aspect of the Speech or Debate Clause has been 
virtually subsumed by First Amendment jurisprudence—that is, there is little effective legislative 
speech covered today that is not also protected by the First Amendment. There is, however, no 
indication that the Framers meant the First Amendment to reduce the Speech or Debate Clause to de 
facto surplusage by making the First Amendment a broader application of coextensive protection.”). 
Shenkman cites AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 125 
(1998) (arguing for the importance of reading the Speech or Debate Clause and the First Amendment 
together, rather than taking a “clausebound” approach). 
 132.  “As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court recognized that it was ‘a general principle of the 
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the 
authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehensions of 
personal consequences to himself.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley 
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)). The doctrine of judicial immunity is rooted in English common
law, and its primary purpose is to preserve judicial independence. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 
219, 225 (1988). 
 133.  The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but it may 
be that state legislatures and executives have seldom tried to restrict the speech of judges, and any 
such efforts may not have been tested in the courts—or at least up to the United States Supreme Court. 
As part of a constitutional Article that provided for the publication of official case reports at public 
expense, the Louisiana Constitution of 1898 prohibited the publication of dissenting opinions. This 
was seen as an “economy measure,” and dissenting opinions continued to be published in a private 
publication, the Southern Reporter. The state Constitution of 1921 eliminated the prohibition. Justice 
Joe W. Sanders, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana, 23 LA. L. REV. 673, 678 (1963).  
134.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 21 n.121, 26 n.155, 36.  
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placement of dissenting and concurring opinions in direct juxtaposition to 
the majority or plurality opinions of the Court has significant functionality 
that could lead to the conclusion that a congressional prohibition of such 
publication would violate the First Amendment rights of the Justices or 
the reciprocal, concomitant, correlative, and derivative right of would-be 
readers to gain convenient access to concurring and dissenting opinions 
that Justices want to publish.135 Professor M. Todd Henderson has written 
an analysis that merits extended quotation: 
Th[e] discourse among litigants, judges, lawyers, academics, students, 
and the public is greatly influenced by the manner in which appellate 
opinions are issued. The most important influence on this discourse is 
the presence or absence of separate opinions. . . . [By the 1940’s] 
[d]issent had proved to be a powerful weapon for change. Furthermore, 
this era saw the rise of legal realism. . . . To increase the power of the 
Court specifically and the law generally, [Chief Justice] Stone 
encouraged debate and controversy, rather than suppressing it[.] . . . The 
issuance of unanimous, per curiam opinions “deciding” particularly 
thorny issues might provoke extrajudicial or even extralegal 
responses. . . . [D]issent allows judges in the future to overrule bad law 
based on the reasoning of their predecessors, in essence allowing the 
Court, and thus the law and lawyers, to play a more political role by 
essentially mollifying the losing parties and encouraging a continuing 
legal discourse. . . . Ironically, the practice of dissent provides the Court 
as an institution with a public and political acceptance it would be unable 
to achieve with per curiam opinions. . . . The credibility of the Court in 
general is enhanced when it reveals, at least to a degree, the integrity of 
its deliberative decision-making process. . . . With individual opinions, 
Justices expose their competence and legal analysis to the world for 
criticism. In this way, dissenting opinions arguably create better 
Justices. With their reputation or career on the line, Justices have the 
incentive to consider each case carefully. But . . . dissent is not just about 
modernity’s quest for deliberative democracy or necessary for the 
proper functioning of a Supreme Court. . . . [D]issent is the strategy that 
enables the Court and the law in general to maintain its institutional 
 135.  It should be noted that, indeed, at times the right to receive information can be more 
important than the right to publish it, even though the two rights are in some sense two sides of the 
same coin. Would-be readers of judicial opinions that could directly affect the readers’ lives—in ways 
that the opinions do not affect the Justices—may well be among those whose interests in receiving 
information are greater that the interests of those who seek to speak. Compare Conant v. Walters, 309 
F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (opining that, if doctors were deterred from 
communicating certain information to their patients, the harm to patients who suffered from 
disabilities in which marijuana offered one of the few hopes for therapy or relief would be far greater 
than the harm that would be suffered by the doctors whom federal policy threatened with sanctions if 
they recommended or prescribed marijuana for medical purposes). 
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power given the highly political nature of the cases the Court decides 
today. . . . Separate opinions not only show society that the process of 
decision making is legitimate, but also allow those who oppose a 
particular result to take comfort that the result may someday be 
reversed. . . . Dissents therefore preserve the ability of the Court to 
maintain its normalizing power. The vulnerability of precedents based 
on less than a unanimous judgment makes the Court and the law 
invulnerable. 
Imagine a per curiam opinion . . . where the absence of dissent reflected 
mere conformity rather than actual agreement. Such an opinion would 
be criticized in part because of [Professor] Stack’s notion of legitimacy, 
but also because opponents of the opinion would have no legal grounds 
to continue the fight. . . . [D]issent allows lower courts, lawyers, and 
politicians to measure the weight of the opinion and to plan a political 
or legal counterattack. Dissents lead to ambiguity and hope of 
change . . . . Without such possibilities for counterattack, the opinion 
would carry more weight, but the integrity of law and the Court might 
well come under siege from more dangerous political forces [leading 
to] . . . [p]ossible . . . impeachment, change in Court composition or 
jurisdiction, or a constitutional amendment. . . . Paradoxically[,] by 
undermining the authority of the Court, dissent increases the power of 
the Court and the law by insulating it from potential political attacks.136 
In short, we no longer live in a country that will accept unsigned 
purportedly majority opinions as if they came from an oracle. We all are 
legal realists. Our citizenry demands judicial opinions that show the views 
of each Justice who chooses to separately state his or her opinion. We 
need to see the reasoning processes. We need to see how the Justices 
grappled with the issues. We need to see the Justices take responsibility 
for their opinions, and we want to know the vote totals. The legitimacy 
and the power of the Court depend on it. 
2. With Respect to Separation of Powers and Article III
Because the two dovetail, I will treat together the issues of the 
bearing of separation of powers and Article III policies on Professor 
Sherry’s proposals. 
I will not take issue with Professor Sherry’s position, “borrowed” 
from Professor Gary Lawson and others, that “the Necessary and Proper 
Clause provides authority for ‘congressional legislation with respect to the 
136.  Henderson, supra note 39, at 328–32, 338–41.  
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operations of the judicial department.’”137 But Professor Sherry agrees 
(with me) that the question whether Congress constitutionally can 
mandate anonymous Supreme Court opinions deserves attention and is 
not a “no brainer” (my language; not hers).138 She also notes that no one 
has addressed the constitutionality of her proposal that Congress prohibit 
separate opinions,139 although she simultaneously reports that Professor 
Michael Stokes Paulsen “‘tentatively concluded’ that because ‘Congress 
lacks power to control the content or manner of judicial opinion-writing,’ 
it could not prohibit the publication of concurrences or dissents.”140 
After distinguishing (from her proposal) the three types of laws that 
Professor Sherry finds the Supreme Court to have identified to be 
forbidden by Article III and its penumbra,141 Professor Sherry presents a 
defense of her proposal based on a discussion of “the scope of the judicial 
power and the essential attributes that are protected from congressional 
interference.”142 She quotes from the writings of a number of scholars who 
have attempted to describe the essence of judicial power or to distinguish 
matters that are not of the essence of judicial power such that legislatures 
may address those matters.143 She infers that “Article III prohibits only 
congressional interference with the decisionmaking process,”144 and 
argues that her proposal lies outside the decisionmaking function because 
it regulates merely “the manner in which the Court can communicate its 
decision.”145 Moreover, as a temporal matter, her proposal relates to a 
matter or matters—nonpublication of concurrences and dissents plus 
nonpublication of the author of the Court’s opinion and the vote count of 
the Justices—that occur only after the decision making process is 
complete.146 Her proposal does “not prohibit the Justices from writing 
concurrences or dissents and circulating them internally,”147 something 
that she concludes would violate separation of powers as well as 
137.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 22, 22 n.123, 24–25. 
138.  Id. at 22 n.125. 
139.  Id.  
140.  Id. at 22 n.126 (emphasis added). 
141.  Id. at 22–24. Professor Sherry identifies as the three types of laws that the Supreme Court 
has held to be forbidden by Article III: (1) laws by which Congress dictates the result a court should 
reach in a particular case; (2) laws by which Congress vests review of decisions by Article III courts 
in executive branch officials; and (3) laws by which Congress retroactively compels federal courts to 
re-open final judgments. Id. at 22–23. 
142.  Id. at 24–27. 
143.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
144.  Id. at 25.  
145.  Id. at 26.  
146.  Id. at 26–27.  
147.  Id. at 26.  
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(probably) the First Amendment.148 Nor, of course, does her proposal 
have Congress prohibit the writing of an opinion for the Court by an 
unidentified Justice. She concludes that for Congress to limit the types of 
opinions that the Supreme Court may publish, to prohibit attribution of 
opinions to named Justices, and to prohibit the publication of Supreme 
Court Justices’ vote counts does not unduly interfere with “the Court’s 
ability to make, explain, or justify its substantive decisions”149 and thus 
would be constitutional. 
Are there rebuttals to these arguments? I believe that there are. Some 
of the counterarguments fall within the realm that Professor Sherry 
assayed. Others look further afield, to a broader view of the functions of 
the Court and its decisions. In addressing the latter, I will be led to address 
Professor Sherry’s anticipation of nonconstitutional objections to her 
proposal and her responses to those objections, features of her paper that 
I have not yet addressed. 
First, counterarguments within the realm that Professor Sherry 
assayed: I agree that, on the surface, because Professor Sherry’s proposal 
does “not prohibit the Justices from writing concurrences or dissents and 
circulating them internally,”150 it does not affect the Court’s decision 
making process. I say “on the surface” because it is quite possible that a 
Justice who is writing a separate opinion that s/he knows will not be 
published along with the Court’s opinion (if any)151 might write 
differently than s/he would write if her or his separate opinion were going 
to be published along with the Court’s opinion. Insofar as the separate 
opinions that are circulated among the Justices would be different than 
they otherwise would be, those differences might affect how, if at all, they 
would influence the Court’s decision and opinion. Thus, the Court’s 
decision and opinion might be different than they would be if the separate 
opinions were to be published as they historically have been, together with 
the Court’s decision and opinion. Indeed, to make the internally circulated 
separate opinions and the Court’s opinion different than they otherwise 
would be is a specific goal of Professor Sherry’s.152 Under these 
circumstances, Professor Sherry’s proposal for congressional action very 
much would affect the decision-making process itself. The proposal would 
148.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 26 n.155. 
149.  Id. at 27–28.  
150.  Id. at 26.  
151.  Under Professor Sherry’s proposal, if five Justices cannot reach agreement on an opinion, 
the Court would note that the decision below is affirmed or reversed, but that the Court cannot agree 
on the reasons. Id. at 13. For ease of reading, I often will omit saying “if any.” 
152.  Id. at 15–17.  
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very likely affect—and thus arguably interfere with153 —the process by 
which the Court makes, explains, and justifies its substantive decisions.154
By Professor Sherry’s own concession, this very well might violate 
constitutional separation of powers. 
Second, Professor Sherry’s concern with undue interference with the 
Court’s making, explaining, and justifying its substantive decisions155 is 
telling. It suggests that we should be concerned not only with the Court’s 
making of its substantive decisions but also with its explanations for and 
justifications of its substantive decisions. While both of the latter inhere 
in what the Court says, they also entail a communicative element. They 
are predicated on an audience (or audiences) outside the Court whom the 
Court is addressing in its decision and opinion. Historically, it is not only 
“the Court” that has been given an opportunity to address these audiences; 
dissenters and writers of concurring opinions also have had the 
opportunity to explain their differences with other Justices and to attempt 
to justify their positions on the issues raised by the case at bar—and to do 
so in a publication that is contemporaneous with and found in the same 
volume (and using the same citation) as the Court’s opinion. If this were 
to change—if the Court’s opinion, if any, were to be published alone and 
unsigned; if concurring and dissenting Justices’ opinions could not be 
published contemporaneously with and in the same volume or through the 
same electronic citation as the majority decision or opinion—the 
communication would be very different and, I believe, impaired. For 
Congress to significantly interfere with the Court’s and the Justices’ 
communication of their views on the cases before the Court strikes me as 
something that should be held to violate separation of powers, for the 
significance of what the Supreme Court does and says is not limited to its 
majority opinions. 
Professor Sherry also argues that “there is a strong argument that the 
democratic legitimacy of Supreme Court rulings comes not from the 
diversity of opinions but from the reasoned explanations given for the 
outcome,” so “the per curiam opinion would provide the same 
legitimacy.”156 Moreover, since, on her proposal, the views of Justices 
who disagree with a majority opinion would merely be relocated, not 
 153.  Because no Supreme Court decisions specifically address many aspects of what Congress 
must not do in relation to federal court opinions, it is unclear when the question whether Congress 
has impermissibly “interfered with” the Court’s making or explaining or justifying its substantive 
decisions is determinative or even relevant. 
154.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 26 n.150, 27. 
155.  Id. at 27–28. 
156.  Id. at 28–29. 
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eliminated, she sees no “substantial” limitation on the publicity given to 
the diversity of views of the Justices,157 although she concedes that the 
writers of separate opinions would enjoy a less effective means of 
communication.158 These positions are quite debatable. As discussed 
earlier, Professor Stack has argued strongly to the contrary that the 
democratic legitimacy of Supreme Court rulings depends fundamentally 
on the Court having demonstrably reached its judgments through a 
deliberative process that entails argumentative interchange among the 
Justices. He has written that: 
The publication of a single opinion could be sufficient to demonstrate 
that the Court’s judgment is based on reasons, but the practice of . . . 
delivering [only] a single opinion would not demonstrate that the 
Court’s judgment is the product of a reasoned dialogue among the 
Justices. The publicity of dissenting opinions and the indication of 
Justices’ individual endorsement of particular opinions reveal that the 
Justices do confront each other with their disagreements about matters 
of principle . . . .”159
Professor Stack seemingly would reject the view that the publication of a 
reasoned majority opinion, separated from dissenting and concurring 
opinions that Justices seek to communicate to persons other than other 
Justices, would suffice to maintain the legitimacy of the Court. I agree. 
We also should remember that Professor Sherry’s proposal includes 
the recommendation that Congress provide that, when the Supreme Court 
cannot agree upon a majority opinion although a majority of the Justices 
agree on the decision of a case, only the latter should be published, with a 
notation that a majority could not agree on an opinion in support of that 
result.160 In such a regime, the reasoned explanation for the outcome upon 
which Professor Sherry predicates the democratic legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court161 would be missing. That legitimacy problem also argues 
against this aspect of her proposal. A set of opinions that explains the ways 
in which the various Justices arrived at their decisions and that explains 
other Justices’ reasons for dissenting would promote far greater 
democratic legitimacy.162 Especially when there is no substantive 
157.  Id. at 29. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Stack, supra note 3, at 2257. 
160.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 13. 
161.  See supra text accompanying note 83. 
162.  Professor Sherry tries to distinguish among democratic, moral or political, and sociological 
legitimacy. I may not understand all the subtle differences among them, but all of these varieties of 
legitimacy probably would be promoted by greater transparency as to the thinking of the Justices after 
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transparency provided by a written opinion from the Court, the need for 
procedural transparency through the publication of competing opinions 
from differing Justices is all the more important—even it if does 
“politicize” the judiciary in some sense and in some cases. 
With respect to separation of powers and Article III in general, it 
should be observed that Professor Sherry’s proposal contains no 
provisions for enforcing the statutory prohibitions and requirements that 
she recommends. If Congress statutorily conferred upon itself power (or 
without a statutory authorization sought) to enforce these statutory 
mandates, those acts too would raise serious separation of powers 
concerns. “The federal courts have long held that Congress may not act to 
denigrate the authority of the Judicial Branch.”163 In Hayburn’s Case,164
several Justices on circuit concluded that the Constitution did not 
authorize Congress to subject an Article III court’s opinion to revision or 
control by an officer of the Executive or Legislative branch.165 In other 
cases, the Court has evaluated whether Congress impermissibly 
aggrandized its power at the expense of another branch or disrupted the 
proper balance between the branches by preventing another branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.166 It is not hard to 
they have had time to consider briefs, arguments, additional research, and deliberations. This does not 
imply that public display of every aspect of the Court’s processes would be beneficial. 
 163.  ELIZABETH BAZAN & MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES 
AND JUSTICES 29 (2005). 
164.  Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). 
 165.  Id.; discussed inter alia in RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.13 (b), (e) (5th ed. 2012).  
166.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel 
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1979 against challenges based on separation of powers 
principles and allegedly impermissible interference with the functions of the executive branch). See 
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397–412 (1989) (holding that the placement of the 
Sentencing Commission, established under Act of Congress, in the judicial branch did not violate 
separation of powers, and Congress’s decision to require at least three federal judges to serve on the 
Commission and to share authority with nonjudges did not unconstitutionally undermine the integrity 
of the judicial branch by assigning extrajudicial duties to Article III judges); Chicago & S. Air Lines 
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1948) (stating that, “Judgments within the powers
vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturn or 
refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”). In a notable federal district court 
decision, the court held that a federal statutory requirement that the United States Attorney General 
report a district court’s grant of a downward departure under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees unconstitutionally interfered with judicial 
independence and violated separation of powers principles. It found a chilling effect on the judiciary 
and that, although the statute did not give either the legislative or the executive branch any coercive 
power over the judiciary, a threat was present. Moreover, it found that no legitimate purpose was 
served by the reporting requirement, which required specification of each case and disclosure of the 
district court judge, the court’s stated reasons for its departure from the Guidelines, and various other 
items of information. United States v. Mendoza, No. CR 03-730 DT, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1449, slip 
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imagine that efforts by Congress to enforce the proposed rules governing 
majority opinions, separate opinions, and vote counts could be held to 
violate these norms. Of course, the judiciary itself could try to enforce the 
requirements, also potentially prompting a test of their constitutionality, 
or Justices could voluntarily decide to abide by them. 
3. Views to Contrast with Professor Sherry’s Evaluations of the
Nonconstitutional Objections to her Proposed Prescriptions
In addition to the considerations examined above, Professor Sherry 
evaluates nonconstitutional objections to her proposals. Professor Sherry 
discusses these arguments under the rubrics of: (1) separate opinions serve 
important purposes; (2) signed opinions serve important purposes; and (3) 
it won’t work. I comment below. 
a. Concerning Separate Opinions
In addition to arguably promoting the Court’s legitimacy, the 
important purposes that separate opinions have been said to serve and that 
Prof. Sherry focuses upon revolve around their—presumably salutary—
influence on the development of the law. Professor Sherry’s answers are: 
that the cases in which this salutary influence is present are exceptional 
and rare; that the separate opinions were unnecessary—that is, the 
Supreme Court decisions that were overruled or discredited “would likely 
have been overruled or discredited even in the absence of dissenting 
opinions”;167 that “pivotal concurrences”168 consequently should be 
unnecessary;169 and that, insofar as pivotal concurrences reduce the 
op. at 12–14, 18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004). The case produced no appellate opinion, however. Most 
of the separation of powers cases that have gone to the Supreme Court have involved alleged 
infringement by the legislative branch upon the bailiwick of the executive branch. See, e.g., Bowsher 
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 improperly assigned executive powers to the Comptroller General, who was 
subservient to Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (upholding a challenge to a section of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act that authorized one House of Congress to invalidate an Executive 
Branch decision to allow a particular alien to remain in the U.S.). 
167.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 31.  
 168.  A “pivotal concurrence” is defined by the scholars who coined the term as those written by 
Justices who join the majority opinion, and whose votes are necessary to make that opinion a majority, 
but which in some way undercut the majority’s reasoning thereby smooth[ing] the process of change. 
Bennett et al., supra note 3, at 817–18, 820, 847.  
169.  See Sherry, supra note 1, at 31–32. I did not altogether follow Professor Sherry’s reasoning 
here. She says that changes that appear to be “a bolt from the blue” should not be made. Id. at 32. I 
would think that some changes in the law are warranted and that pivotal concurrences and dissents, 
because they can make some changes in the law not “bolts from the blue,” therefore would be a good 
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political cost of overruling, they increase the likelihood of overruling, 
which negatively affects doctrinal stability. 
I have not done an independent empirical study, but several scholarly 
writings on the beneficial effects of dissents and concurrences disagree 
with Professor Sherry’s (and Professor Penrose’s) views that those 
separate opinions’ effects are rare.170 Among the noteworthy articles of 
this ilk are The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial 
Civility, in which Professor Edward Gaffney provided illustrations from 
every period in Supreme Court history, corresponding to the tenures of 
the Chief Justices through Chief Justice Rehnquist, demonstrating the 
“vital role [that dissents have played] in the growth and development of 
the law.”171 Moreover, Professor Sherry’s speculation that the Supreme 
Court decisions that were overruled or discredited “would likely have 
been overruled or discredited even in the absence of dissenting opinions” 
is just that—speculation—and it does not address whether, absent the 
prescient separate opinions, the changes that were made would have been 
made as quickly, nor whether and how the earlier separate opinions might 
have altered the precise changes in the law that the Court (or lower courts) 
made. These things are unknowable, and it seems to me there is no good 
reason to presume against the salutary effects of separate opinions—
unless one has an ax to grind. Professor Sherry has one because she is 
advocating for Congress to prohibit the publication of separate opinions 
by United States Supreme Court Justices.172 
At bottom, I am not as cynical as Professor Sherry. I do not see that 
“dissents and concurrences . . . feed the view that precedent, principle, 
and legal reasoning exert no influence.”173 Nor am I Pollyannaish; I see 
world views and ideologies influencing the respect given (or not given) to 
thing as they also reduce the political cost of overruling. But Professor Sherry apparently is more 
concerned with doctrinal stability, which causes her not to like pivotal concurrences. Id. at 32.  
 170.  See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 3, at 866–71 (discussing the importance of separate 
opinions in signaling the possibility of a different constitutional vision and smoothing the path to legal 
change; discussing cases); Gaffney, supra note 25, at 592–623 (supporting at length the proposition 
that “dissents have played a vital role in the growth and development of the law [and] illustrat[ating] 
this conclusion with . . . examples from each period of Supreme Court history.”).  
171.  Gaffney, supra note 25, at 592. 
 172.  Professor Sherry also argues that the most polemic dissents are both the most likely to be 
cited in later majority opinions and the most likely to be perceived as evidence of a “political and 
polarized Court.” Sherry, supra note 1, at 32. Her goal is to get rid of them. But, even if the data she 
relies on are correct, those may not be the dissents that most influence the development of the law. 
Hence, this point does not very effectively undercut the argument that separate opinions, or dissents 
in particular, have had (and presumably would continue to have) salutary effects on the development 
of the law.  
173.  Id. at 33. 
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precedent; I see legal reasoning, precedent, and principle distorted to 
reach desired outcomes. But I do not view the situation as having reached 
the point at which “suppressing dissents and concurrences is a necessary 
corrective.”174 I see Justices in their opinions attempting to respond to 
points made by other Justices—although not always and not completely 
and perhaps not with the greatest intellectual honesty.175 But if one desires 
to have “concurrences and dissents . . . improve the majority opinion by 
forcing the [authoring] Justice . . . to respond and therefore to produce the 
best possible opinion,”176 the way to foster such behavior is not to shunt 
concurring and dissenting opinions into separate publications. 
b. Signed Opinions
Professor Sherry identifies the arguments in favor of signed opinions 
as avoiding decisions by a faceless bureaucracy; holding judges and 
Justices accountable; preserving judicial legitimacy; and ensuring “that 
the judge has engaged in an appropriate dialogue in the decisionmaking 
process.”177 Signed opinions also enhance the reputations of individual 
Justices.178 She responds that the Court already issues unsigned opinions, 
often uncontroversially, and she views the “costs” of signed opinions as 
now outweighing their benefits. Among the costs she identifies are that 
signed opinions may encourage Justices to “dig in their heels” and refuse 
to compromise; may encourage undesirable accountability to a fan base 
more than (or rather than) desirable accountability to a broader swath of 
society; and through that mechanism and others, may cause the reputation 
and legitimacy of the Court as an institution to suffer. 
One could elaborate on the arguments in favor of signed opinions, 
articulating them in ways that are (perhaps) more persuasive, still focusing 
largely on accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and perhaps 
independence.179 One might suggest that the pride of authorship provides 
174.  Id.  
175.  Cf. id. at 33–34. 
176.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 33. 
177.  Id. at 34. 
178.  Id. at 34–35. 
179.  See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 
GEO L.J. 49 (2006) (“[A]lmost every group that creates anything adopts a process for attributing 
responsibility”); id. at 55 (“Attribution is, first, a reward and an incentive for future creativity. Second, 
it is a form of discipline that punishes unacceptable work. Third, attribution enables consumers to 
assess quality and sellers to create a brand. Finally, attribution serves a humanizing function, linking 
the products of work to the reality of human endeavor. Each of these functions requires that the right 
to attribution be inalienable, at least in some contexts, so that the people who are credited or blamed 
for a work are in fact the ones behind its creation. Attribution matters differently in different contexts, 
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an incentive to do the work conscientiously.180 One similarly could 
elaborate on downsides of anonymous decisions and opinions, some of 
which would point to the reduced accountability and transparency that 
would characterize such a system. The costs of signed opinions that 
Professor Sherry identifies go to how the signing of opinions may 
adversely influence the dynamics of the Court as well as its reputation as 
an entity and its legitimacy.181 Individuals will vary in how they weigh the 
pros and cons. But it strikes me as a very big step to move to uniformly 
unsigned opinions—a step that is very much in tension with our history 
and our culture, and hence a step that should not be taken lightly, even on 
an experimental basis.182 As noted in a comparative study of legal systems, 
“the U.S. system generates its legitimacy primarily by publicly 
argumentative means.”183 
Moreover, it is not at all clear to me that Professor Sherry’s proposal 
effectively would do away with signed opinions. Just as the demand for 
access to ostensibly nonprecedential “unpublished” opinions of the 
intermediate federal courts of appeals led to the publication of those 
opinions in “Federal Appendix” advance sheets and volumes and on 
mainstream databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, it is predictable that the 
demand for access to concurring and dissenting opinions by Justices of 
the Supreme Court would lead to the publication of those opinions in 
suitably titled West advance sheets and volumes and on mainstream 
databases. Especially if those opinions were signed, what would have 
been accomplished? Not only would the prohibition on signed opinions 
have been circumvented, but the prohibition on the publication of separate 
opinions effectively would have been defeated. Even if not signed, some 
votes could be inferred from the opinions. Other votes and the name of 
however.”); id. at 56. With respect to judicial opinions, Professor Fisk opines that “a strong norm of 
non-attribution is problematic because there should be some transparency about how the Justices of 
the Supreme Court do their work. Justices are public officials exercising governmental power, and . . . 
in a democracy, there should be transparency about all branches of government.” Id. at 97 n.161. 
Although Professor Fisk very largely has in mind contexts other than judicial opinion-writing, a 
moment’s thought makes clear that the functions of attribution to reward and provide incentives for 
good work, to provide a necessary prerequisite to “punishment” for poor quality or otherwise 
unacceptable work, to permit outsiders to assess the quality of work and Justices to “create a brand,” 
and to link the Justices’ work product to their individual efforts all fit very well in the judicial context.  
 180.  See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 312–13 (2004) (observing that the signed 
judicial opinion “creates an environment and expectation of individual judicial responsibility for the 
judicial opinion and for its reasoning” and therefore has reputational consequences). 
181.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 13–19. 
182.  I do not mean to imply that Professor Sherry takes that step lightly. 
183.  LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 179, at 338. 
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the author of the majority opinion might or might not be leaked. Professor 
Sherry hopes for restraint from the same Justices whom she does not trust 
to try her proposals without the intervention of Congress184 and hopes that 
“playing to the base might . . . be less visible (and therefore less 
damaging) if not conducted on the Supreme Court’s website, the pages of 
the United States Reports, or other official or semi-official sources.”185
These hopes seem unrealistic to me. 
If the only way to truly ensure unsigned majority opinions is to 
prevent the Justices from knowing who authored the opinions, and the 
only way to truly eliminate publication of separate opinions is to prohibit 
their writing (or perhaps to make punishable their disclosure and the 
disclosure of their authors’ names), and the only way to prevent the 
disclosure of vote counts is to allow only the Chief Justice (or perhaps the 
author of a majority opinion, where there is one) to know the vote counts, 
then it is hard for me to see how Congress could enact such measures 
without violating the principles of separation of powers. Professor Sherry 
has not argued to the contrary. 
c. It won’t work
Professor Sherry articulates certain of the practical objections to her 
proposal this way: 
[I]t won’t work at all, either because vote counts will leak and Justices 
will just publish their dissenting and concurring opinions elsewhere, or 
because the sniping and signaling and pandering that currently takes 
place in separate opinions will be displaced into oral argument instead. 
The second is that, in a sense, it will work too well, reducing 
transparency and suppressing any dissent that exists. That would allow 
an unaccountable majority to impose its will unfettered by minority 
criticism, and perhaps lead the public to discount the Court’s opinions 
by assuming that every case is five to four.186
Her first response is that, if the foregoing prediction is accurate, 
Congress can just repeal the law. Implicitly, the proposal still will have 
been worth trying. Beyond that, Professor Sherry says that she is fine with 
separate opinions being published outside the official reporters (perhaps 
because she recognizes the strong reasons to believe that a complete ban 
on them would be unconstitutional) and takes solace in such publications’ 
184.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 10, 33, 37. 
185.  Id. at 37. 
186.  Id. at 36.  
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carrying less weight than an official dissent or concurrence would have.187 
I have presented some of my responses above.188 In addition, if Justices 
would publish these separate opinions under their names or if their names 
were inferable,189 I don’t know why the influence of the separate opinions 
would “be more directly related to [their] persuasiveness and less [directly 
related] to [their] author.”190 Nor would it necessarily be true that editors 
would not provide syllabi or headnotes to facilitate readers’ understanding 
of these opinions and enable the readers to capture the essence without 
having to carefully read through the opinions.191 Indeed, for the reasons 
stated above,192 it seems to me that Professor Sherry’s proposal would not 
work because the attempted separation of dissents and concurring 
opinions from the Court’s decision or majority opinion will be just 
cosmetic—the separation will merely require a few extra quick clicks on 
the computer to put the pieces together—even apart from any increased 
“leakage” of individual Justices’ positions into the oral arguments.193 
Professor Sherry posits alternatively that her proposal might not 
work because it may “reduc[e] transparency and suppress[] any 
dissent . . . . That would allow an unaccountable majority to impose its 
will[,] unfettered by minority criticism, and perhaps lead the public to 
discount the Court’s opinions by assuming that every case is five to 
four.”194 Professor Sherry acknowledges this risk and that “[b]road, deep 
rulings on highly contested issues . . . could generate a backlash against 
187.  Id. at 15, 21 n.121, 36.  
188.  See supra text accompanying note 134 and following text at note 135.  
189.  See supra text following note 184.  
190.  See Sherry, supra note 1, at 36 (stating that “A dissent that lacks the imprimatur of the 
United States Reports and that is somewhat remote in time and place from the single majority 
opinion . . . will be more directly related to its persuasiveness and less so to its author. As it stands, a 
polarized public need only look at the syllabus to decide whether to support or reject a decision . . . .”).  
 191.  Id. at 36 (observing that, “If the elites who read opinions and translate them for the public 
(including legal academics and journalists) actually have to read the opinions to find out what they 
say – and then search out dissenting voices – that is already an improvement.”).  
192.  See supra text following note 184.  
 193.  Professor Sherry discounts the dangers of such leakage in light of hope for restraint by the 
Justices, by noting that the Justices are likely to temper their disagreements in face-to-face 
interactions, and by observing that comments made in oral arguments are unlikely to get the attention 
from media and the public that written dissents and concurrences get. Sherry, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
While those consequences are possible, it seems to me that the more successful Professor Sherry’s 
proposed constraints on written dissents and concurrences would be, the greater would be the 
incentives and temptations for the Justices to make their points during oral arguments and the less 
reason there would be to hope for restraint from the Justices. The less successful the proposed 
constrains, the less need the Justices would have to use oral argument as a platform for their 
viewpoints—to the detriment of time for and attention to what the lawyers have to say.  
194.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 36. 
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the Court and make those rulings harder to enforce,”195 particularly if 
“there is a persistent minority[,] and winners and losers turn out to track 
political divides”196 or people believe that to be happening. She does not 
believe that this is a significant cost of her proposal because the Court 
rarely is unanimous in controversial cases (in which the public is 
particularly interested) anyway. Here too I cannot agree that her proposal 
would not impose significant costs. There is evidence that when the Court 
enters a unanimous or nearly unanimous decision in a high profile, 
controversial case, the high level of Justices’ support for the decision will 
not change the minds of persons in society who strongly disagree, but the 
existence of dissent may tend to undercut the strength of popular 
opposition to the decision and support the legitimacy of the Court because 
this evidence of debate on the court may lead those who disagree with the 
decision to infer a “fair, democratic decision-making process in which 
both sides were heard.197 The combination of near-unanimity which 
195.  Id. at 37.  
196.  Id.  
 197.  Michael F. Salamone, Judicial Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional Response to 
Supreme Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RES. Q. 320, 322 (2014) (finding no evidence that majority 
size affects individuals’ level of agreement with Court decisions with respect to decisions that are 
highly salient, and no evidence that persons who already agree with the outcome of a decision are 
moved by the number of Justices who dissent; but finding that, on issues that are somewhat less salient 
to particular individuals, those individuals may be more accepting of a decision when separate 
opinions show that the Court has members who are receptive to the individuals’ position, i.e., in those 
circumstances, “large majorities are likely to persuade ex ante opponents to accept adverse 
opinions.”). See id. at 331–332. Salamone concludes that “the implications of these findings are that 
a Court strategically trying to build . . . public confidence is not best off acting unanimously as much 
as possible; rather[,] it is better off acting unanimously selectively. Id. at 332. See generally Henrik 
Litleré Bentsen, Dissent, Legitimacy, and Public Support for Court Decisions: Evidence from a 
Survey-based Experiment, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 588, 589 (2019) (“Despite the presumed harmful 
effect of judicial dissent on public support, only a handful of empirical studies from the United States 
exist on this relationship. The results of these studies are also inconsistent. Whereas some studies 
show no effect of unanimity or dissent on public opinion (Gibson et al. 2005, Marshall 1987, Peterson 
1981), other studies suggest that unanimity does in fact bolster support (Zink et al. 2009). In a recent 
study, . . . Salamone (2014) . . . argues that dissents may help increase support of issues of higher 
salience among the court’s policy opponents by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. Hence, the 
dynamics of how dissent might influence public support appear contingent upon individuals’ 
preexisting attitudes toward the issues at stake.”); Scott S. Boddery, Laura P. Moyer & Jeff Yates, 
Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on Citizen Assessment of Policy 
Outcomes, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 353, 354, 366, 377 (2019) (finding support for its hypothesis that 
when legal decisions are attributed to the United States Supreme Court—as opposed to a specific 
justice—more people are likely to agree with it; but also confirming that this relationship is 
conditioned on citizens’ ideological identity, that is, the study confirmed the hypothesis more for self-
identified conservatives than for self-identified liberals). It also should be noted that the study focused 
on decisions concerning criminal procedure and its results may not reach beyond that sphere. See also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769 
(2015) (concluding in part that, “With respect to the normative issues, the standard arguments in favor 
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“sends a strong signal of the correctness of the decision”198 and the 
presence of dissents that sends a message that at least the process leading 
to the decision was fair and democratic could not be sent under Professor 
Sherry’s proposal.199 
III. A NOD TO PROFESSOR ORENTLICHER
In April, 2020, I became aware of an essay by Professor David 
Orentlicher, entitled “Judicial Consensus,” that he posted on SSRN earlier 
this month.200 Professor Orentlicher questions why the Supreme Court, 
and other appellate courts, decide cases by majority vote, noting that that 
system exacerbates polarized politics.201 He argues that it is “important 
for the Supreme Court, as well as other appellate courts, to decide cases 
unanimously. In particular, to satisfy the due process requirement of a 
neutral court, justices and judges should decide their cases by a consensus 
of the full bench so that decisions reflect both sides of the ideological 
spectrum.”202 He later adds that unanimity is required to satisfy principles 
of due process “[b]ecause it is unfair for litigants to have their cases 
decided by an ideologically skewed court.”203 Further, “[i]t is important 
to have justices with a range of backgrounds and ideological perspectives 
who reach a consensus decision after careful deliberation”204 [as] “the 
collective wisdom of the full group is superior to that of a single justice 
or a mere majority of justices.”205 Moreover, “[d]ecisions that are 
representative of the full court have another important virtue. They have 
greater legitimacy.”206 
of a higher level of consensus within the Court—pointing to the values of legitimacy, stability, and 
minimalism—rest on fragile empirical foundations.); see also PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING 
OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 77, 92–93 (2010) (finding that a precedent 
accompanied by an expansive concurrence, that is one that “attempts to expand the holding or to 
supplement the reasoning of the majority opinion” increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court 
will positively treat the precedent . . . and influence lower court compliance).  
198.  Sherry, supra note 1, at 37.  
 199.  A 1979 study failed to support the hypothesis that “the greater the original support for a 
decision at the Supreme Court level, the greater the subsequent compliance with that decision by the 
lower courts.” C. Johnson, Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A Quantitative 
Examination, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 792 (1979). Compliance by the lower courts is a different matter, 
however, than how the public reacts to United States Supreme Court decisions.  
200.  David Orentlicher, Judicial Consensus (UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law Research 
Paper 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569058. 
201.  Id. at 1. 
202.  Id. at 2. 
203.  Id. at 9. 
204.  Id. at 4. 
205.  Id. at 5. 
206.  Id. at 8. 
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Many of these arguments are appealing, although the Supreme Court 
never has held that it violates due process for litigants to have their cases 
decided by an ideologically skewed court. If that were the law, it might 
well invalidate a great many decisions, depending upon the circumstances 
in which courts would find that the deciding court was “ideologically 
skewed”! Professor Orentlicher’s argument for legitimacy when decisions 
are unanimous is much stronger than an argument for legitimacy when 
Justices disagree with a holding but their views are forcibly withheld from 
the public (or shunted off to a separate publication) and when nothing 
requires their views to be taken into account by a majority. The latter 
would be the situation under Professor Penrose’s and Professor Sherry’s 
proposals. 
As I read this portion of Professor Orentlicher’s essay, I wondered 
how in the world unanimity would be attained. Professor Orentlicher 
replied to what he must have known many people would wonder. Despite 
the fact that he recognizes that “justices [now] dissent in about 60 percent 
of rulings”207—and that doesn’t even count concurrences, in which the 
reasoning differs from that undergirding the primary opinion—Professor 
Orentlicher opines: 
[W]e need not worry about a requirement of unanimity. First, justices 
are carefully screened before nomination for their training, experience, 
and perspectives, and the vetting process excludes candidates with views 
that are too extreme and not adequately based on an understanding of 
the U.S. legal system. In addition, principles of game theory provide 
reassurance that each justice would choose cooperation over 
conflict. . . . [W]hen people must work with a group of peers on a 
frequent basis to decide matters, they realize that they are better off 
developing collegial rather than oppositional relationships.208 
He adds that: 
Cooperation is also more likely in relationships with an indefinite time 
horizon, as with justices who have lifetime appointments . . . . Finally, 
cooperation is more common among individuals who come to their 
relationship with equal status and authority. That is true about Supreme 
Court justices, except perhaps with chief justices.209 
I don’t know a lot about game theory. But my experience is not 
consistent with Professor Orentlicher’s reassurances. For example, at least 
in recent years, I do not think it has been true that “justices [have been] 
207.  Id. at 13. 
208.  Id. at 8. 
209.  Id. at 25–26. 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/2
2019] RESPONSE TO PENROSE AND SHERRY 569 
carefully screened before nomination for their training, experience, and 
perspectives, and [that] the vetting process [has] exclude[d] candidates 
with views that are too extreme and not adequately based on an 
understanding of the U.S. legal system.”210 We have seen candidates 
carefully vetted only by highly politicized groups that hold views that 
many informed Americans would consider extreme and that have pushed 
candidates with extreme views. We have seen Presidents nominate such 
individuals and we have seen the minority party unable to block the 
appointments of such individuals. On lower courts we have seen the 
appointment of candidates who have been rated “unqualified” by the 
American Bar Association. Moreover, while my lack of knowledge of 
game theory prevents me from appraising how accurately it predicts that 
judicial candidates will strive to develop collegial, rather than 
oppositional, relationships as a general matter, the numbers of concurring 
and dissenting opinions over the last 80 years suggest that the theory has 
not been borne out in Supreme Court consensus. Moreover, the nasty and 
disrespectful judicial opinions of certain judges and Justices, including 
Justice Scalia, strongly suggest that game theory is inadequate to predict 
or guarantee how judges or Justices will behave in this regard. 
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that neither the vetting process nor the 
judicial decision-making process have occurred in a context in which 
Supreme Court judicial decisions and opinions have had to be reached 
unanimously or not at all. We therefore cannot know what the 
consequences for judicial appointments or for judicial decision making 
would be in a world in which unanimity would be required for a judicial 
decision to be reached or a judicial opinion to be announced. 
Professor Orentlicher also contends that the potential for gridlock 
will be small, partly because of the degree of congruence of viewpoints 
among the Justices, in part because of the Justices’ obligation to decide 
critical legal questions, and in part because the self-interest of the Justices 
would push them to find ways to resolve their differences so they could 
resolve cases.211 “[D]ecision-makers adjust their behavior to their 
decision-making rules.”212 I suspect that I do not see as much congruence 
of viewpoints among the Justices as Professor Orentlicher does.213 And it 
would remain to be seen whether and when the Justices’ obligation to 
210.  Id. at 8. 
211.  See id. at 21. 
212.  Id. at 22. 
213.  He concludes that, “Functionally under a requirement of unanimity, a Court of nine will 
generally have only two true veto players, though the identities of those players will vary somewhat 
from case to case.” Id. at 21. 
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decide critical legal questions and the Justices’ self-interest in fact would 
lead them to find ways to resolve their differences so they could resolve 
cases. If those compromises occurred infrequently enough, the Justices 
might throw up their hands and choose (or lobby for) a different system, 
whether that different system would be a reversion to our current system 
or something else. I suspect that the very ability to change the system (or 
to seek to change the system) would likely lead to a less successful 
transition than if the Justices understood that they were stuck with the 
need to reach unanimous decisions or make no decision at all. Before 
getting to that point, however, Justices would have to decide in which 
cases they could live with compromise and in which they would rather not 
decide (and leave the lower court’s decision standing) than compromise. 
That decision presumably would be affected by how intolerable a circuit 
split would be, when such a split was an important factor in the grant of 
certiorari, and whether it was more critical to provide an answer to the 
question posed by a case than to provide the or a “right” answer. I am sure 
that other factors also would prove to be influential in whether the Court 
would reach a compromise that culminated in a unanimous decision. 
Finally, Professor Orentlicher asks: “If the justices had to find middle 
ground, would the Supreme Court change from a leader of social change 
into a follower of social change that is championed by the president or 
Congress?”214 After volunteering reasons why it might be a good thing for 
the Supreme Court to become such a follower, Professor Orentlicher 
opines that “even if major change is important, the Supreme Court’s 
history demonstrates that Justices and judges from different sides of the 
ideological spectrum can come together to issue path breaking decisions. 
In fact, many of the Court’s landmark decisions enjoyed broad support 
among the Justices.”215 “In short, requiring consensus probably would not 
have a significant effect on the likelihood that the Court would champion 
social reform. However, it would provide a fairer process for litigants, 
promote a more deliberative and sounder decision-making process, and 
greatly reduce the political maneuvering that has made for a drawn-out 
and highly partisan judicial[-] selection process.”216 I subscribe to the 
goals stated in that last sentence, but whether a demand for unanimous 
decisions would bring them about remains an open question, as do the 
questions whether the change to a Court that had to decide unanimously 
if at all would change the Supreme Court from a leader of social change 
214.  Id. at 27. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. at 31. 
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to a follower of such change, and whether that role change, if it occurred, 
would be for good or evil, or sometimes one and sometimes the other. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Publicity of Professors Penrose’s and Sherry’s arguments will be a 
good thing. It should spark debate and conceivably might prompt the 
Justices to change behaviors that are not serving the Court or the country 
well. But Professor Penrose’s ultimate recommendation that the ABA 
restore Judicial Canon 19—urging “self-restraint to promote solidarity of 
conclusion”—would be merely hortatory; it would lie in the Justices’ 
discretion how much that Canon should alter their behavior. More 
importantly, for the many reasons cited in this Article, adoption of 
Professor Sherry’s proposals and Professor Penrose’s similar ideas would 
be not beneficial to the Court or the country. Despite the unruliness of our 
current system, signed Supreme Court concurrences and dissents, 
published contemporaneously with signed opinions of a majority or 
plurality of Supreme Court Justices, give us the most thoughtful and 
transparent exchange of views that our Court is capable of delivering. 
They do more to support the legitimacy of the Court than purportedly 
univocal utterances and silenced disagreements (even if feasible) could do 
in our present world or in any world for which we should hope. Professor 
Orentlicher’s proposal to require unanimous decisions is an interesting 
one and would moot a number of the problems with Professor Penrose’s 
and Professor Sherry’s proposals—particularly if there were not only 
unanimous decisions but opinions of the Court in which all of the Justices 
joined. Then there would—or could—be no concurrences, no dissents, 
and no uncertainty about the number of Justices joining. But the degree to 
which unanimous decisions would be attainable, and at what costs, remain 
very open questions. 
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